

JPRS-UMA-85-060

12 November 1985

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS  
MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL  
No 7, July 1985


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12 November 1985

## USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

### MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 7, July 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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## DECISIVE ROLE OF USSR ARMED FORCES IN DEFEAT OF NAZI GERMANY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 12-21

[Keynote speech by USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, MSU V. I. Petrov, at a scientific conference devoted to the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945]

[Text] The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" provoundly and convincingly disclosed the world historical importance of the victory of the Soviet Union and the contribution of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to the victory over Nazi Germany and its allies.

World War II was the largest scale, most destructive and bloody in the history of mankind. Armed combat broke out in Europe, Asia and Africa, on a territory of 40 states as well as over enormous expanses of oceans and seas. More than 110 million persons were mobilized into the ranks of the belligerent armed forces.

World War II, as is known, started between the capitalist countries, but the general political aim of the Nazi coalition states was primarily to establish a revolutionary renewal of the world, to destroy the Soviet Union as the first socialist country, to strengthen social, national and racial suppression in the world and eliminate the independence and sovereignty of all peoples.

The forced entry of the USSR into the war and the ensuing Great Patriotic War brought about profound qualitative changes in the entire military-political situation in the world and opened up a new period of World War II. Involved in the war was a socialist state occupying one-sixth of the world's territory with a population of around 200 million persons and possessing enormous military-economic and moral-political potential as well as large armed forces.

The center of the struggle against the bloc of Nazi states as of the summer of 1941 shifted to the Soviet-German Front. Precisely the USSR Armed Forces made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan. Their might, the sources of military victories and the superiority of military science and military art were predetermined by the advantages of our social, economic and state system, and by indoctrinating the Soviet soldiers

in a spirit of loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist ideology and to the cause of the Communist Party, friendship of peoples and internationalism.

In the course of the commenced war the Soviet state in all of its foreign policy activities endeavored to establish the best international conditions for its victorious completion. Of major importance was the formation of the anti-Nazi coalition which led to the thwarting of the plans of the Nazi states which aimed at the military and political isolation of the USSR. The establishing of the anti-Nazi coalition confirmed the correctness of the Leninist foreign policy course of our party. In practice the possibility was shown of collaboration among states with a different sociopolitical system.

The Soviet people during the war years rightly praised and now also regard the major contribution to victory made by the peoples and armies of the United States, Great Britain, France, China and other countries in the anti-Hitler coalition. We also highly regard the unstinting struggle against the Nazi invaders on the part of the soldiers from the military formations and partisans of Yugoslavia. The Polish Army and Czechoslovak Army fought courageously along with the Soviet Army. Entered for all eternity in the chronicle of the anti-Nazi struggle are the actions of the patriots of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Hungary and the participants of the Resistance Movement which developed widely in the occupied countries.

But it is the historical truth that the Soviet people and their Armed Forces led by the Communist Party blocked the path to the Nazi aggressors to world domination and to their expansion in other countries and continents. The basic results in armed combat were achieved precisely on the Soviet-German Front. What could not be achieved by a single bourgeois army in the West was carried out by the Soviet Army defeating the main forces of Nazi Germany.

On the Soviet-German Front, the Nazi military-political leadership used a predominant share of their troops and the troops of the European allies. During the first 2 years, the main Wehrmacht forces fought against the Soviet Army. Subsequently, two-thirds of the total number of formations which Nazi Germany then possessed were on the Soviet-German Front. On none of the fronts in the course of World War II were there so many personnel and diverse military equipment as on the Soviet-German Front. Here, up to 70 percent of the Nazi army divisions were fighting here during the entire war and three out of four Nazi soldiers were constantly fighting on the Eastern Front and only one on the Western. On none of the fronts of World War II were there such extended, continuous and fierce military operations as on the Soviet-German Front. From the first to the last day here there were bloody engagements which at different times encompassed either the entire front or significant parts of it.

The history of World War II shows that the long and difficult path to victory by the Allied Troops over the bloc of Nazi states lay through armed combat on the Soviet-German Front. In preparing to attack the USSR, Nazi Germany in the course of the military campaigns in the West in the European countries captured weapons, enormous supplies of strategic raw materials, metallurgical and military plants. The weapons of 180 French, Belgian, Dutch, English, Norwegian and Czechoslovak divisions fell into the hands of the aggressors.

In France alone, the Nazis captured 4,930 tanks and armored personnel carriers as well as 300 aircraft. Almost 6,500 enterprises in the 11 German-occupied countries in June 1941 were operating for the Hitler Wehrmacht.

For the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany fielded an invasion army which was unprecedented in military history and which consisted of 190 divisions, 47,200 guns and mortars, 4,300 tanks and around 5,000 aircraft. This meant that up to 77 percent of the personnel of the operational German armed forces was fighting against the Soviet Army, in essence, all the tank and motorized divisions and aviation. The enemy surpassed the troops in the western military districts which took the first attack by 1.9-fold in terms of personnel, by 1.5-fold for medium and heavy tanks, by 1.2-fold for guns and mortars and by 2.3-fold in terms of new types of combat aircraft. On a number of sectors the enemy had a superiority of 3-4-fold and on the main one, on the point of the thrust by Army Group Center there were 15 enemy divisions against 4 of our divisions. At the same time, on the West German Front on the territory of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France there were only 47 German divisions and they, in essence, were not fighting at all but were an unique reserve ready to be shifted to the Eastern Front.

In the history of the Great Patriotic War the initial period was the most difficult. But as a result of the heroic efforts of the Soviet troops, the strategic front by mid-July had been stabilized and enemy losses just in ground forces were around 100,000 men and one-half of the tanks participating in the offensive. German aviation had lost 1,284 aircraft. By the end of July the total losses of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht exceeded 213,000 men.

On the Soviet-German Front for the first time in the course of World War II the falaciousness of the idea of a "blitzkrieg" against a state possessing enormous military-economic and moral potential became apparent. The heroic defense of Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa and Sevastopol as well as the Battle of Smolensk which lasted almost 2 months contributed significantly to thwarting the Nazi plan to quickly defeat the USSR.

Of particularly important significance were the events on the Moscow strategic sector. Being unable to break through to the capital without a pause, the enemy by 1 October 1941 had concentrated some 1.8 million men, 1,700 tanks, over 14,000 guns and mortars and around 3,190 aircraft to take Moscow. But the enemy did not get through, it was ground down and bled white. Conditions developed for going over to a counteroffensive and the Soviet troops successfully carried this out. The victory at Moscow was of historical significance. The Nazi plan for a blitzkrieg suffered a complete and final collapse, the myth of the "invincibility" of Nazi Germany was dispelled and its troops suffered their first major defeat in World War II. By the end of the Battle of Moscow the total losses of the Wehrmacht ground forces were over 1.5 million men and this was 5-fold more than the total losses suffered by them in Poland, Northwestern and Western Europe and in the Balkans in 1939-1941. The enemy was deprived of the basic mass of tanks and aircraft. In order to replenish the losses, the Nazi Command, from December 1941 through

April 1942 was forced to shift 39 divisions and 6 brigades, around 800,000 soldiers and officers, to the Soviet-German Front.

**History has not known examples when a country at the outset of a war was in such a difficult situation as the USSR but still found the force not only to hold out but to achieve such an outstanding victory.**

In the summer of 1942, in benefiting from the lack of a second front in Europe, Nazi Germany again undertook a major offensive to the south. The Battle of Leningrad became the center of military-political events of that time. As is known, the battle lasted more than 6 months. In individual stages of it both sides committed more than 2 million men, 26,000 guns and mortars, more than 2,000 tanks and assault guns and up to 2,000 aircraft. In terms of the number of personnel and combat equipment and in terms of the duration and fierceness of the battles, it surpassed all previous engagements in world history. In the course of the battle the total enemy losses were 1.5 million killed, wounded and captured soldiers and officers and this exceeded one-quarter of the entire number of Nazi troops fighting at that time on the Soviet-German Front.

In the West, the Battle of Stalingrad is often compared with the engagement in North Africa. However, the total enemy losses in the course of the Battle of Stalingrad exceeded by 30-fold the losses at El Alamein. Moreover, the battles in North Africa were of local importance while the victory at Stalingrad not only undermined the military might of Naziism but actually prevented the realization of the plans to win world domination. Within the Nazi bloc disintegration had begun. The successes of the Soviet troops had a sobering effect on the Japanese and Turkish governments which were preparing their troops to enter the war against the USSR. The battle on the Volga had an enormous impact on the development of military events on the other fronts of World War II and on widening the scale of the anti-Nazi struggle in the occupied countries.

By the summer of 1943, the military-political situation of the Soviet Union had been further strengthened. Having ground down and bled white the enemy in a stubborn defensive engagement at Kursk and then going over to the offensive, the Soviet troops routed the Nazis. The Nazi Army lost over 500,000 men, 3,000 guns, 1,500 tanks and more than 3,700 aircraft. The Nazi Command was forced to go over to the strategic defensive on all the fronts of World War II.

As a result of the defeat of the major Wehrmacht forces, good conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy at the beginning of July 1943 and the withdrawal of Italy from the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Under the influence of the successes of the USSR in the war against Germany, favorable changes occurred in the strategic situation in the Pacific and Southeast Asia in favor of the Allies.

The victory of the Soviet troops on the Kursk Salient demonstrated to the entire world the ability of the Soviet Union by its own forces to defeat Nazi Germany. This was reaffirmed by the battle for the Dnieper in the course of which the Soviet troops dealt a major defeat to the Army Group Center and



liberated the Left-Bank Ukraine, the Donets Basin and Kiev, upsetting the plans of the leaders of Nazi Germany to wage a protracted positional defensive war. The operations of the Soviet Armed Forces carried out in 1944 led to new political and military results. Soviet territory was almost fully liberated from the Nazi invaders and the state frontier was restored. In the summer of 1944, when it became obvious that the Soviet Army was capable of destroying the German military machine by its own forces, the Western Allies could not delay further in opening a second front. On 6 June, the Anglo-American troops landed on the coast of Northern France.

Of course, the landing of Allied troops in Western Europe contributed to accelerating the final defeat of Nazi Germany which was now forced to wage war on two fronts. The landing of the Anglo-American troops in Western Europe was a major success for that cause for which the anti-Nazi coalition had been formed. Indisputable are the valor and courage shown by the troops of the armies of the United States, England and France in combat in the second half of 1944 and in 1945. However, the landing in northern France and subsequent combat against Nazi Germany were undertaken at a time when the Soviet Armed Forces were dealing severe defeats to the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German Front.

From mid-1944, the great liberation campaign of the Soviet Army commenced and it provided direct aid to the European peoples in their struggle against Nazi Germany. In the process of the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces combat collaboration was established with the people's armies in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. This collaboration now comprises the cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact the armies of which for three decades now have been in one battle formation to defend peace and socialism.

The Soviet government, in sending its Armed Forces to liberate the nations of Europe and Asia, acted strictly in accord with the standards of international law and provided enormous aid to the peoples which had risen to fight for their freedom. The Red Army, wrote the American newspaper NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in June 1945, actually was the liberator army of Europe and one-half of the world in the sense that without this army and without those innumerable sacrifices by which the Russian people had won it, liberation from the cruel yoke of Nazism would have been simply impossible.

Due to the victories of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces on the Soviet-German Front, the states of the anti-Hitler coalition had a constant opportunity to develop their military-economic potential, to work out plans and prepare carefully for conducting combat on different fronts. **However, the Anglo-American Command was in no hurry to use them.** Considering the limited scope and little activity of Allied operations, the Nazi Command without any particular risk sent constantly new forces from Western Europe to the Soviet-German Front. In the winter and spring of 1944, regardless of the fact that the Nazi Command endeavored to strengthen defenses in the West and to prepare to repel a landing by the Anglo-American troops in France, it shifted more than 40 divisions from Germany and other countries to the Soviet-German Front.

In 1945, Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] ordered the Soviet Armed Forces to complete the defeat of the armed forces of Nazi Germany and to

provide help to the countries of Central and Southeast Europe in liberation from Nazi enslavement.

The Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out this mission. "Victory in the Great Patriotic War," emphasized the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," "showed the superiority of Soviet military science and military art as well as the high level of strategic leadership and combat mastery of our military cadres."(1)

Having assumed the impact of the main forces of Nazi Germany and its allies, the Soviet Union played the main role in their defeat. The outcome of World War II was decided precisely here. The Soviet Armed Forces defeated 507 Nazi divisions and 100 allied divisions, almost 3.5-fold more than on all the remaining fronts of World War II. On the Soviet-German Front, the German Armed Forces lost 10 million men, killed, wounded and captured of the 13.6 million, that is, more than 73 percent of the total losses during the war. Here the basic part of the Wehrmacht's military equipment was destroyed: more than 70,000 (more than 75 percent) aircraft, around 50,000 (up to 75 percent) tanks and assault guns, 167,000 (74 percent) artillery guns, more than 2,500 fighting ships, transports and auxiliary vessels. However, these successes cost the Soviet people a great deal. During the war they lost more than 20 million of their sons and daughters.

The Soviet-German Front not only involved the main Wehrmacht forces but also differed sharply from the others in the duration of armed combat and intensity. Of the 1,418 days of its existence, the sides here conducted active combat on 1,320 days. All the remaining fronts and theaters of operations were characterized by significantly less intensity. Thus, on the North African Front, out of the 1,068 days of its existence there was active fighting only on 309 days and on the Italian Front, 492 out of 663 days.

Also unprecedented in history was the spatial scope of the armed combat on the Soviet-German Front. From the very first days here it developed on lines reaching more than 4,000 km. By the autumn of 1942, the front exceeded 6,000 km. Basically, the length of the Soviet-German Front was 4-fold longer than the North African, Italian and Western European taken together. The depth of the territory on which the military confrontation of the Soviet Army against the armies of the Nazi bloc occurred can be judged from the fact that the Soviet troops fought more than 2,500 km from Stalingrad to Berlin, Prague and Vienna. Not only 1.9 million km<sup>2</sup> of Soviet land were liberated from the Nazi invaders but also 1 million km<sup>2</sup> of territory in the countries of Central and Southeast Europe.

As is known, at that time the crucial role of the Soviet Armed Forces in the war was recognized and highly praised by the U.S. President F. Roosevelt, the British Prime Minister W. Churchill and other leaders of the Allied states in the anti-Hitler coalition. However, after the war the ideologists of imperialism set out to falsify the role of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the victory over Nazi Germany. In light of this an objective demonstration of the contributions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces

**in World War II will serve not only to restore historical truth but also will be a strong warning to the current aggressive forces.**

**In endeavoring to play down Soviet military art, as well as the decisive role of the USSR in the defeat of the Nazi bloc, certain "specialists" in the West have asserted that "there was little brilliance in the strategy of the Russians," the planning of the operations by the Soviet troops was "devoid of imagination" and so forth. The aim of these accusations is transparent for us. It is not only to play down Soviet military art but also to conceal the scale of Nazi bestiality on the temporarily occupied territory. All these "accusations" have been well replied to by MSU G. K. Zhukov: "Now, of course, it is very easy and simple to be concerned with a paper calculating of the balance of forces and lecture profoundly on what number of divisions would have been needed to win one or another battle a quarter of a century ago and argue where more troops and where less troops should have been committed above the number which now seems right for one or another historian. All of this was immeasurably more complicated on the battlefields."(2)**

**Recently in the United States and other capitalist countries an important place has been given to the opening and role of the second front in World War II.**

**Undoubtedly, the opening of the second front in Western Europe made definite changes in the balance of the Nazi divisions on the defensive on the Soviet-German and Western European Fronts. But it did not change the significance of the Soviet-German Front as the main one in the war. Thus, in June 1944, 181.5 German divisions and 58 German satellite divisions were fighting against the Soviet Army. The American and English troops were opposed by 81.5 German divisions. Before the final campaign of 1945, the Soviet troops were opposed by 179 German divisions and 16 satellite divisions while the Anglo-American troops had 107 German divisions opposite them.**

**In line with the significant date of the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, bourgeois ideologists have endeavored to persuade their peoples that the victory of the Soviet troops was achieved exclusively due to the assistance from the United States and England. We are forced to recall that, having signed an agreement on the delivery of military equipment, both countries under various pretexts delayed in providing concrete aid to the Soviet Union. During the first, most difficult period of the war, the USSR virtually did not receive any aid from the Allies. Although the U.S. government did announce the granting of 1 billion dollars worth of aid to the Soviet Union, by the end of 1941, however, the USSR had received just 545,000 dollars worth of American military materiel. The total proportional amount of goods and materials received by the USSR under Lend Lease during the period of the war did not exceed a total of 4 percent of the amount of industrial production at Soviet enterprises.**

**It must not be forgotten that during the war years there was also a reverse Lend Lease under which the United States received from us 300,000 tons of chromium and 32,000 tons of manganese ore as well as much platinum and fur. By the deliveries from the USSR, wrote J. Jones, American secretary of commerce during the war years, we not only recovered our money but even**

exacted a profit. The Soviet Armed Forces defeated Nazi Germany with Soviet-made weapons which were supplied in sufficient quantity by our nation's defense industry. The U.S. President F. Roosevelt at one time commented that the Americans never considered the Lend Lease deliveries to be the main factor in the defeat of Germany. This was achieved by the men of the Red Army who gave up their lives in the fight against the common enemy. These frank admissions cannot be eradicated from the memory of people and from the history of World War II.

**The Soviet people have a great military history, a history of just wars in defense of the socialist fatherland.** The lessons of the last war teach the need to unmask the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and to thwart its plans and they teach vigilance and the necessity of always being on guard.

**The war fully disclosed the high level and creative nature of Soviet military science and military art as well as the talent and generalship capabilities of our military leaders.**

In achieving a victory over Nazi Germany, an important role was played by the skillfully organized and effectively implemented strategic leadership over the Soviet Armed Forces. Their training and strategic employment were based upon the principle of a unity of political and military leadership which expressed the leading role of the Communist Party in the organizational development of socialism and the defense of its victories. All the most important questions of leadership over the Armed Forces were determined by the Central Committee and the Politburo of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee. The questions related to leadership over military operations were discussed, as a rule, at joint sessions of the Politburo of the party Central Committee and Headquarters. These sessions examined the plans of the campaigns and major operations as elaborated by the General Staff and the command of the fronts. The art of strategic leadership over the Soviet Armed Forces was manifested unusually vividly in the Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk Battles and in the offensive operations of 1943-1945. The State Defense Committee [GKO] and Hq SHC clearly and effectively worked out the plans, they were efficient and farsighted in the overall concepts, they were mobile and decisive in the methods of achieving them and consumed resources economically. In the contest of will, knowledge and art of troop command they gained the upper hand over the strategists of Nazi Germany.

The history of military art was enriched by the vivid examples of major strategic operations and the elaboration and conduct of these operations are linked to the names of such talented generals and admirals as I. V. Stalin, G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budenny, K. Ye. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, A. I. Antonov, I. Kh. Bagramyan, N. F. Vatutin, N. N. Voronov, L. A. Govorov, A. G. Golovko, A. I. Yermenko, I. S. Konev, N. G. Kuznetsov, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. A. Meretskov, A. A. Novikov, F. S. Oktyabrskiy, I. Ye. Petrov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, F. I. Tolbukhin, V. F. Tributs, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy and others.

The USSR Armed Forces in 1941-1945 conducted more than 50 operations by groups of fronts, around 250 front operations and thousands of engagements and battles in the course of which military theory and practice were enriched with

outstanding examples of strategy, operational art and tactics. A majority of the operations was marked by originality of concept, by high skill of the command, political and all personnel and by the great effectiveness of attacks against the enemy. The superiority of Soviet military art expressed the advantages of the social system and the military organization of the socialist state as well as the creative nature of its military science.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces would have been **inconceivable without the strong rear** of the Soviet nation which, having brought together all the might of the coordinated efforts of our people, was a source of material and spiritual power of the Soviet Army and Navy. The rear of our state not only stood up against the powerful organized military machine of the coalition of Nazi states but also ensured an economic victory over the enemy. This was the material basis for the victory in armed combat. The rear ensured the winning of technical superiority of our troops over the Nazi army and it supplied them with modern and most efficient means of armed combat.

No matter how adroit the Western politicians may be, they can never refute the **historical truth about the decisive contribution** of the Soviet Union to the victory over Nazi Germany. This defeat had a most profound impact upon the entire subsequent course of world development. The world socialist system arose and is successfully developing and the process of the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism has accelerated and this will end in its downfall.

The USSR Minister of Defense, MSU S. L. Sokolov has emphasized that the experience gained by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War is truly invaluable. It was gained by the blood of many millions of people, it was tested in the course of the difficult war against the enemies of our motherland and for this reason is of lasting importance for present-day conditions, too. From this inexhaustible source of military wisdom it is possible to gain a great deal that is useful both for the superior-level military leaders as well as any officer, sergeant, officer candidate or soldier. This is an important factor in indoctrinating the Soviet soldiers and one of the sources for the further development of military art.

The last war convincingly showed the **superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces** over the Nazi Army which was the strongest and most experienced in the capitalist world. They surpassed it not only in terms of technical equipping but also in terms of the moral-political and combat qualities of the personnel.

In the battle of unprecedented scale against Naziism, the USSR Armed Forces covered themselves with undying glory. The just, liberating goals of the war which was waged by the Soviet Union gave rise to **mass heroism, courage and steadfastness** which have no equal in history and no equal in any of the countries which participated in World War II. More than 11,600 men were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 7 million soldiers received orders and medals of the Soviet state, while many fighters, commanders and political workers received orders and medals of foreign states, including the United States, England, France and other countries.

**The basic traits of military art** characteristic of the Soviet Armed Forces during the period of the last war, and primarily those such as profound scientific prediction, a creative search for new methods and forms of conducting operations, a thorough consideration of the situation, decisiveness and activeness in achieving the set goals, the conformity of the missions to the combat capabilities of the troops, initiative and operational-tactical maturity of the commanders and staffs, their ability to win over the enemy not by numbers but by ability and the art of the commanders and political bodies to maintain high troop morale, have fully kept their importance in our days.

The Great Patriotic War was an authentic school for gaining combat experience and for improving the military skills of the commanders, staffs and troops. The profound study, generalization and practical utilization of combat experience and its introduction into the practical operational, combat and political training of the troops and staffs play an important role in increasing the combat skill of the command personnel and in developing their operational-tactical thinking and the ability to achieve decisive victories in battles and engagements against a strong and perfidious enemy. But combat experience is important not only on the level of its creative application in our days but also from the viewpoint of developing in the command personnel a dialectical approach to studying and solving operational-tactical questions as well as in a more profound understanding of the patterns and trends in the development of modern military art.

For 40 years now, our people have been living and working under conditions of peace. This great achievement has been possible due to the immortal feat of the Soviet people and their valorous Armed Forces carried out during the years of the Great Patriotic War and due to the consistent and peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth in the postwar period.

However, the reactionary forces of imperialism do not wish to consider the lessons of the last war. The United States has set out on an arms race and has turned to practical measures to implement extensive programs in the aim of achieving military superiority and militarizing space. All the recent achievements of science and technology are being employed for preparations for a new war. Evermore advanced and more powerful means for delivering nuclear weapons to the target are being developed and long-range and highly accurate weapons and qualitatively new electronic systems are rapidly being developed to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons. In a word, the imperialists are endeavoring to do everything possible to ensure the launching of the first devastating attack against the USSR.

"In the complex international situation," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev at the extraordinary March (1985) Plenum of the party Central Committee "as never before, it is important to maintain our motherland's defense capability on a level so that the potential aggressors are well aware that any encroachment on the security of the Soviet nation and its allies or on the peaceful life of the Soviet people will be met with a crushing retaliatory strike. Our glorious Armed Forces in the future will possess everything necessary for this."(3)

The harsh lessons of the last war remind us of the need to maintain the greatest vigilance and closely watch the intrigues of the enemies of peace.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 17 June 1984.
2. KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1970, p 93.
3. KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 7, 1985, p 11.

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## COL GEN GAREYEV ON MILITARY SCIENCE, FUTURE WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 22-30

[Article by Col Gen M. A. Gareyev, deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, doctor of military sciences, under the rubric "Scientific Papers"(1): "The Creative Nature of Soviet Military Science in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] The superiority of Soviet military science and military art and the high level of strategic leadership and combat skills of our military personnel were important factors ensuring the decisive contribution of the Soviet Armed Forces in defeating fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. This was convincingly shown in MSU V. I. Petrov's report at the plenary session of a scientific conference.

The high level of development of Soviet military theory and practice and their creative nature were the natural result of the advantages of our social and state system. Most importantly, they have always been and continue today to be steadily guided by the profoundly scientific Marxist-Leninist theory, the ideological and methodological basis of the entire system of knowledge of war and the army.

Back when bourgeois military theorists were arguing whether scientific knowledge was possible in the field of waging war, V. I. Lenin concluded that the revolutionary class, the proletariat, coming to power, was able to and had to develop its own military science. The proletariat needed it in order to conquer the bourgeoisie, disarm it and put an end to wars. He emphasized that it was impossible to build a modern army without science, having in mind primarily military science.

Guided by the teaching of Lenin concerning the protection of the socialist fatherland, the Communist Party has always attached great importance to the development of military science as one of the key factors of the state's defensive capability and the Armed Forces' combat might. Formation and development of Soviet military science was accomplished together with major sociopolitical and economic reforms which radically changed the make-up of our country and resulted in the strengthening of its defensive might and the



technical reconstruction of the Armed Forces. All this served as a material base for the development of military theory and practice.

In the prewar years, taking into account the disposition of forces in the international arena, our military doctrine was based on the fact that war would have to be waged against a powerful military coalition of imperialist states. It was proven that under the influence of the new weapons of armed conflict a new world war could not be a blitzkrieg, but would be prolonged in nature and would require the mobilization of all the forces and capabilities of the state.

The theory of military art in general was permeated with a spirit of **decisive, offensive, fluid actions**. In the event of aggression, powerful retaliatory strikes were envisioned, transferring military operations to the enemy's territory in order to deliver a crushing defeat. The strategic offensive was considered the main type of strategic operation. It was planned to be accomplished in the form of simultaneous and successive front operations conducted by formations and units (obyedineniya, soyedineniya) of various branches of the Armed Forces. Recognizing the fluid nature of operations and battles in a future war, Soviet military-theoretical thought also did not deny the possibility of solid fronts emerging. In this connection, much attention was given to the problems of breaching defenses and exploiting tactical success into operational success. The development of the theory of deep operation was an outstanding achievement of Soviet military science and military art.

The Great Patriotic War **put all the tenets of our military science and military art to a severe test**. One can confidently say that the key tenets of Soviet military-theoretical thought were borne out. In any event, in the entire history of wars no one has yet managed to predict the nature of armed conflict in the future with such a degree of reliability. The most obvious proof of this is the victory of Soviet military science and military art over Germany's military theory and practice which were always considered to be the height of bourgeois military theory and practice. Military figures of the entire capitalist world admired them and derived their ideas from them. No falsifiers of the history of World War II are able to refute this either.

At the same time, it would be wrong to assert that the tenets of our military theory were **faultless and comprehensively developed back before the war**. Such an approach not only belittles what was achieved at the cost of great efforts during the war, but also does not contribute to an objective study of the patterns of military-theoretical training today and prevents determining correctly why certain phenomena can be predicted before each war and others cannot.

To begin with, on the eve of the war Soviet military theory did not fully take into account the **possibility of a sudden invasion of major enemy forces and insufficiently worked out the problems of the initial period of the war and the forms and methods of conducting defenses on an operational-strategic scale**. At the same time, organizing and conducting a strategic defense was one of the most complex problems which had to be resolved in the very first days of the war. It is sometimes said that we did not in principle deny

defense as a type of military operation. You see, it is not a matter of formal recognition or nonrecognition of defense, but primarily those practical conclusions and measures which result from this and the realization of these theoretical conclusions by development of specific defensive operation plans and their practical preparation.

It is important to take this into account in today's conditions as well, for military theory becomes a material force and a component element of military art only when it is mastered by the main mass of officer personnel and when it is realized in practice.

Great efforts were made from the very start of the war to make all military-theoretical views correspond to the requirements of the actual established conditions of waging armed conflict. The Communist Party and the Soviet command devoted much attention to the further development of Soviet military science and military art, timely dissemination of combat experience to the troops and the navy and their skillful application of military theory. In the complex conditions of war the theory of military art and other branches of military science developed part and parcel with the practice of armed conflict.

In contrast, in the course of the war the Soviet Armed Forces conducted hundreds of different operations; as a rule, they were all noted for the **creative nature and novelty of the methods of operations used and proved to be unexpected for the enemy.** The development of flexible forms of preparing and conducting defensive operations with subsequent going over to a counter-offensive and the theory of the strategic offensive operation; solving the problem of operational and strategic breakthrough of enemy defenses with subsequent encirclement and destruction of major groupings; finding new methods of combat employment and cooperation of the various branches of the Armed Forces and arms and services, such an effective form of firing upon the enemy as an artillery and air offensive, new forms and methods of structuring battle formations, all-round support of operations and firm control--these and many other problems, solved creatively and in a new manner in the course of the war, retain their value to a certain extent in today's conditions as well.

The theory of military art was enriched by the **experience of preparing and conducting operations by a group of fronts** which was the prototype of the modern strategic operations on a continental theater of military operations (TVD). Air forces, along with participating in the operations of groups of fronts and front operations, conducted major air operations. The combat operations of air defense formations, accomplished according to a single plan for the purpose of breaking up subsequent mass enemy air strikes, began to acquire the characteristics of an air defense operation. More improved forms of cooperation between ground and naval forces were found. Methods of employing amphibious assault landing forces were developed further.

During the war, the organization and methods of controlling troops and naval forces reached a high level, from the Supreme High Command (SHC) and General Staff on down to units and subunits (soyedineniya, chasty, podrazdeleniya). A scientifically sound, clear-cut organization of control was developed, further strengthening one-man command and increasing the role of headquarters.

Control organs were brought as close as possible to the troops. Representatives of the Hq SHC traveled to the fronts. Commanders of fronts and armies widely used observation posts and other forward control posts. The work methods devised during the war by commanders, staffs and political organs for creative working out of solutions, developing operation and battle plans, producing detailed estimates and working out in advance possible variations of performing each operational and tactical mission and organizational activities for thorough preparation of an operation and battle, their operational, logistical and technical support, achieving secrecy of measures conducted and surprise of actions and organizing party-political work require close study by military personnel today as well.

The bundle of basic tenets of Soviet military art and the combat experience accumulated during the war were perhaps best outlined by MSU G. K. Zhukov at a military-scientific conference in 1945. **First--an excellent knowledge of the enemy**, the correct assessment of his intentions, forces and weapons; the ability to take into account what he is capable and not capable of doing and how he can be caught. **Second--knowledge of one's own troops and their thorough preparation for combat.** **Third--achieving operational and tactical surprise.** This is ensured by the fact that the enemy is misled about our true intentions. It is necessary to act so quickly that the enemy is late in everything and everywhere and thereby gets into a difficult situation. **Fourth--a precise estimate of forces and weapons depending on the set task.** Troops must not be given tasks beyond their strengths. This results in nothing but losses and undermines fighting spirit. It is better to conduct offensive operations less often and amass forces and weapons for decisive blows. **Fifth--material support of operations.** Under no circumstances should an operation be conducted that is not prepared in a material respect. The overall situation may push the high command toward the most rapid accomplishment of an operation. But it can be begun only after thorough preparation and all-round support.

Marshal G. K. Zhukov considered the skillful use of artillery and a bold maneuver for the purpose of encircling and destroying the enemy to be an important condition of successful development of an offensive operation. He regarded a frontal blow only as an important stage on the way to achieving the objective. A breakthrough must be accomplished not for the sake of a breakthrough, but to gain freedom of maneuver which makes it possible to strike the enemy from the direction he least expects. Marshal G. K. Zhukov also emphasized that these principles are well-known, but when applied formally they do not yield results, and that we studied the art of using them in practice the entire war. This again indicates how great the distance is between formal learning of a theory of military affairs and mastery of military art, which is not always seen in the proper perspective in the practice of training military personnel.

The principle of teaching troops what is needed in war found the most complete scientific development and practical implementation during the war. Throughout the war the Red Army and Navy were persistently and intensely engaged in combat training, taking into account the experience of the war and the impending specific combat missions. Combat operations themselves served

as an indispensable school for improving the military skills and moral and fighting qualities of personnel.

The main conclusion from the experience of the war in this area, which will never lose its importance, is that combat training retains its meaning and answers its purpose during peacetime only when under no circumstances does it deviate from the reference points determining the nature of a future war, when no conditionalities and indulgences are permitted and the entire training process and military education are structured strictly as in combat. As USSR Minister of Defense MSU S. L. Sokolov points out, the more severe the exactingness in peacetime combat training, as in actual combat, the fewer the losses and the more victories in combat. When our military leaders and commanders demonstrate high exactingness of subordinate troops in the course of troop training during war and now during peacetime, this was and is the result of the highest concern for the interests of the fatherland, as well as humaneness and genuine respect for man in the highest and most noble understanding of them. The lessons of war confirmed with exceptional strength the wisdom and vitality of Lenin's words: "Intense military training for a serious war requires not an impulse, a call or combat slogan, but long, intense, most persistent and disciplined work on a massive scale."(2)

During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet command attached great importance to timely summarization and dissemination of combat experience to the troops. The Hq SHC, General Staff, the Main Political Directorate, the People's Commissariat of the Navy, command and staffs of the branches of the Armed Forces and arms and services, formations and units were not only organs of practical troop leadership, but also the main centers of military-theoretical thought. Direction of the war was inconceivable without creative work for preparing scientifically sound decisions and drawing up regulations, instructions and orders summarizing everything progressive in the experience of waging war. In this respect, the best traditions of military-scientific work established by M. V. Frunze were continued and raised to new heights. During the civil war he issued orders summarizing the experience of combat actions after each operation and sometimes in the course of it as well.

During the war, a directorate for utilizing the experience of war was established in the General Staff, the sections and departments were established in the headquarters of fronts and armies respectively. There also were sections for utilizing the experience of war in the central directorates of the People's Defense Commissariat, the Main Headquarters of the Navy and headquarters of the arms and services. Studying the experience of war, they had to make the conclusions necessary for the troops and disseminate them to a wide range of officers.

The rich combat experience of the Soviet Army was reflected in the manuals, regulations and instructions drawn up and updated during the war. For example, the infantry Field Service Regulations and Field Manual, River Crossing Instructions, Instructions on Troop Operations in Mountains, the Manual on Breaking Through Fortified Areas, the Manual on Breaching Static Defenses and others were drawn up and reworked in 1944. In all, 30 manuals, regulations and instructions dealing with conducting combat operations and troop training were reworked during the period of 1943-1944. The war required

of military science theoretical substantiations and practical recommendations for building the Armed Forces and equipping them with armament and equipment. The most important achievements in this area can be considered the optimum determination of the composition of combined arms divisions, armies and fronts and the creation of tank and air armies as well as powerful SHC reserves, which made it possible to employ artillery, aviation and other weapons in mass on key axes. During the war a large amount of new-model armaments and equipment entered the inventory, including more improved aircraft, tanks, rocket and antitank artillery and others.

**The specificity and objectivity of the research conducted in the course of armed conflict at the fronts attract attention.** Summarization and theoretical comprehension of the combat experience were organically included in the practical activities of military leaders, staffs and political organs. The war required a responsible attitude toward military theory. Attempts to disregard the experience amassed and the theoretical recommendations developed on its basis very soon made themselves felt by failures at the front. The war quickly rejected from prewar theory and practice everything impractical and required the development of a whole series of new tenets of military science and military art.

At the same time, it must be noted that the army of fascist Germany, in spite of the significant nonconformity of prewar regulations to the experience of World War II, especially after the attack on the Soviet Union, did not revise hardly a single regulation in the course of military actions, although it conducted combat operations for 6 years. According to captured documents and the testimony of officer prisoners, it was established that analysis and summarization of combat experience in the German fascist army were conducted only by publishing individual instruction booklets and directives. Many fascist generals say in their memoirs that one of the reasons for the defeat of their army was that they conducted combat operations both in the East and in the West according to the same regulation documents.

**Thus, the high level of military-scientific work in the Soviet Armed Forces was one of the important conditions for achieving the superiority of Soviet military science over the military science of fascist Germany.** The experience of its organization and conduct largely retains its importance, and we use it directly in today's conditions.

A key and fundamental problem of military science was and remains the correct disclosure of the nature of a future war, should the imperialists manage to unleash it. Research of both the experience of past wars and modern military affairs must be subordinated to solving this problem. At the same time, predicting a war which has not yet taken place and developing theoretical principles for conducting it become increasingly more difficult as the qualitative gap between the means of conducting armed conflict in the past and in the future increases.

The Great Patriotic War, especially graphically, confirmed the vitality of Lenin's tenet that wars are now waged by peoples, and war is not reduced only to armed conflict. The defensive capability of the Soviet state is supported in a scientific respect by an entire system of knowledge about war and the

army. Scientists of all branches of social, natural and technical sciences, including military, have made a worthy contribution to the cause of victory and to increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces. We rightfully and proudly talk today about the victory of our military science in the Great Patriotic War (even our enemies are forced to admit this), but military science is not even mentioned in the general classification of sciences in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and certain other official sources. But it does not cease to exist because of this, and it is advisable to take this into account.

In today's conditions of rapid scientific and technical progress not only in military affairs, but in other spheres of human activities as well, decisions have to be made more and more often without sufficient experience. Military practice during peacetime has always been comparatively limited. For example, at exercises it is impossible to reproduce completely everything that may be in war, especially in conditions of the enemy employing weapons of mass destruction. That is precisely why the experience of past wars and exercises conducted and military practice as a whole become even more valuable.

Undoubtedly, much of the operational art, tactics and those specific standards which guided us during the Great Patriotic War is now outdated. But the experience, methods and skills of preparing a battle and operation have not become outdated, and the creativity with which our commanders and political workers solved the most complex problems of conducting combat operations will never be out of date. Of especially great importance is the combat experience of first-hand work on the terrain to study the enemy, clarify tasks, organize cooperation and conduct camouflage, deception and other measures in order to ensure secrecy of preparing an operation and surprise of actions.

Many times in history after a large war (Franco-Prussian, Russo-Japanese, World War I) certain theorists have tried to make it appear that nothing remains of the previous military art. However, the next war, giving rise to new methods of waging armed conflict, retained many of the previous methods. It was this way during the past war as well. History has not yet known, so far at least, a war which could nullify everything there was in military art before it. At the same time, one must take into account that the next war retains less and less of the elements of the old and increasingly gives rise to the new. This pattern gathers increasingly more powerful potential strength.

Today it is not simply the experience of the past that is important for us, not that which lies on its surface, but those deep, sometimes hidden stable processes and phenomena which have a tendency to develop further and show up at times in new, altogether different forms than in the preceding war. Such experience of any war can never lose its importance completely if it is truly analyzed deeply, and scientifically sound conclusions are drawn from it. If, based on the experience of the Spanish Civil War and the experience of other large and small wars, unsound decisions were sometimes made, in this case it was not the experience of these wars that was at fault, but those incorrect conclusions which were drawn from it. These were conclusions which did not arise from the experience of a given war, but were subjectively thought up and artificially attached to it for "substantiation" of some or other unfounded opinions and decisions.

In military historical work today the summarization of the specific experience of war and the preparation on this basis of good aids for officer personnel acquire especially great importance, for the majority of them do not have combat experience. It is also important to conduct research which could contribute to the scientifically sound resolution of modern military problems.

The new qualitative leap in improving the means of armed conflict has an enormous influence on the development of military science and on increasing its role. This fact requires Soviet military science to work out theoretically many important problems of building, training and using the Armed Forces, predestining a shift of the center of gravity to the area of a struggle of military-scientific and scientific-technical ideas.

The timely and sound elaboration of operational-tactical requirements for the development of armament acquires especially great importance. Engels' proposition that the development of weapons determines the development of methods of conducting armed conflict remains true today as well. But now military science can no longer be restricted merely to calculating this influence. In modern conditions the reverse influence of military science is increasing sharply; military science itself must more actively determine the most important directions for the development of weapons and armament, having placed primary emphasis on the most promising types of weapons which will have decisive importance in the future.

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider that the arms race, through the fault of the imperialists, is becoming unprecedented in scale, weapons are becoming increasingly more expensive, and we are opposing enemies who are considerably more powerful economically than ever before in the past. Therefore, military-theoretical thought must work continually on how to use most efficiently the funds allocated for military needs within the limits of strict necessity so that defenses are reliable and, at the same time, not too burdensome for the state. The essence of this problem, the main thing which must run through all scientific research, is an all-round increase in the effectiveness of all measures taken to build and train the Armed Forces, a stricter and deeper accounting of military-economic considerations, improvement of the scientific level of leadership of troops and naval forces and more complete use of the achievements of science in practical activities.

It has already been said, for example, that certain theoretical elaborations on the initial period of the war in the late 1930's were considerably richer than they were realized later in practice. Not all scientific achievements were completely realized on other problems either. These lessons indicate how important it is to be attentive to new scientific achievements.

We now can talk about the turning point in the development of military science and military art in the most developed countries. On the whole, a new qualitative leap is imminent in the development of military affairs, related both to the further improvement of nuclear weapons and especially to the appearance of new types of highly accurate conventional weapons in NATO countries. In this connection, the need arises to reinterpret the fundamental military-political and operational-strategic problems of protecting the socialist fatherland.

All of this results in new, higher demands on organizing scientific work in the Armed Forces. As in solving other problems, in this matter we are guided by the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, which required that the main efforts of science be directed primarily at the timely solution of the most important problems of practice, the effectiveness and quality of scientific research be raised sharply and the achievements of science be incorporated more efficiently into practical activities.

As USSR Minister of Defense MSU S. L. Sokolov suggests, the practical activities of all directorates, staffs and military educational institutions and military personnel must be organically combined and merged with scientific research. Just as during war, military-scientific work cannot be viewed as something apart from official duties. It is a most important duty of all officials, and it is impossible to complete successfully the complex and crucial tasks facing the army and navy at this stage without it.

Today, when the aggressiveness of imperialism has increased and open military preparations are underway against the USSR and other socialist countries, the problem of maintaining the Armed Forces at constant high combat readiness acquires especially great importance, taking into account the increased importance of the initial period of war.

The opinion once existed that peaceable states, as a rule, are found to be less prepared for war than aggressive states. This was even considered a regularity. But such an objective regularity did not exist then either. Now, times have changed radically, and in modern conditions it is impossible to permit imperialist powers to have a military superiority over socialist states. We have real economic and military capabilities for this.

The Soviet Army and Navy, like our entire country, no longer stand alone in opposition to the entire surrounding world of imperialist states, as it was in the 1920's and 1930's. The armies of the fraternal socialist countries, which have the most modern weapons and everything necessary to curb the aggressors, stand united with the USSR Armed Forces. Their combat cooperation is a source of might and a reliable guarantee of the security of the countries of socialism.

During the postwar years, imperialism has repeatedly brought mankind dangerously close to a large military conflict, but, having encountered the might of the forces of socialism, it was forced to retreat. A conclusion results from this: In the situation in which we live and in the conditions of the existing military threat originating from imperialist states, when our specific peaceable proposals are rejected, we have no other alternative but to combine our steps toward peace with an all-round strengthening of the defensive capability of the Soviet state and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Our advanced Marxist-Leninist military theory determines also the scientifically sound nature of Soviet military doctrine, which is a result of the peace policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. In political terms, the defensive direction of our military doctrine is also determined by this.



It is directed at ensuring the reliable protection and security of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

But the defensive nature of the military doctrine not only does not preclude, but also assumes a high combat readiness of the Armed Forces for retaliatory strikes and aggressive, decisive actions of our Armed Forces should an aggressor decide to attack us. We do not strive for military-technical superiority, but we will do everything, as during the Great Patriotic War, so that we not only do not give way, but ensure our own superiority in the level of military art of our military cadres and combat skills of personnel. This is one of the inexhaustible sources for further increasing the fighting efficiency of the army and navy without any additional material expenditures.

Furthermore, we have to take into account that the improvement of the means of armed conflict, the increasing role of the time factor and the establishment of massive professional armies in the imperialist countries impose increased demands on the readiness of troops to carry out immediately the combat missions levied on them. In past wars, we managed with great difficulty to eliminate shortcomings in troop training and military education in the course of combat operations. The need to continue troop training during a war will never, apparently, go away completely, although in modern conditions there will be less time and fewer opportunities for this. In this connection, the importance of qualitative indicators in military instruction and education of troops and naval forces, training young people for military service, military-patriotic indoctrination of workers and further improvement of mass defense work in our country is increasing sharply today.

The entire system of military instruction and education of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces must ensure fulfillment of the primary task set before them by the party and the Soviet government: Vigilantly stand on guard of the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people, together with the armies of other socialist countries reliably protect the achievements of socialism and always be ready to repulse any aggressor. For us this is the primary conclusion from the experience of war, and we see this as our obligation to all the participants of the Great Patriotic War and to all our people.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The contents of the scientific reports are published in abridged form taking into account material published earlier in the journal.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 325.

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## SOVIET STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN YEARS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 34-37

[Article by Prof, Army Gen M. M. Kozlov, chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov]

[Text] Skillful strategic leadership was one of the most important factors which ensured the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Its essence was expressed in enormous, coordinated work on the part of the superior political, state and military bodies and in immediate leadership over military operations and their thorough support.

For organizing the repulsing of the enemy, it was essential to have a force capable of uniting the country into a single military camp and to mobilize all its human, material and spiritual resources. Such a force was the Communist Party, its Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo. The activities of the party were based upon the well-known Leninist instructions that modern "wars are not waged by peoples" and that "once things have reached the point of a war, everything should be subordinate to the interests of the war, all internal life of the nation should be subordinated to the war...and not even the slightest hesitation on this score is tolerable."(1) The Great Patriotic War fully confirmed this Leninist conclusion which lay at the basis of Soviet strategic leadership.

The Communist Party was the combat organizer and inspirer of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the socialist motherland and for achieving victory over the enemy. Its Central Committee was that staff from whence leadership over the conduct of the war was provided. All the fundamental questions of the conduct of the war and the state's foreign policy were settled by the Politburo, the Orgburo [Organizational Bureau] and Secretariat of the Central Committee. Over the war years over 200 sessions of these superior party bodies were held on major military questions.(2)

At the start of the war (30 June 1941), the State Defense Committee [GKO] was formed by a joint decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars], with all power in the nation being

concentrated in its hands. At the head of this extraordinary body was I. V. Stalin. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the GKO carried out colossal work. It approved and carried out the most important directives and decrees on the strengthening of the military economy, on military organizational development and the strengthening of the Armed Forces.(3)

Headquarters of the High Command were established by a decree of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR SNK on 23 June 1941 for leadership over the Armed Forces and on 8 August this was renamed Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC]. The General Staff was the working body of the Hq SHC.

The strength of the party's collective reason was most fully apparent in the activities of the higher party, state and military bodies. Many fundamental decisions on the leadership of the war were taken at joint sessions of the Politburo, GKO and Hq SHC. For example, on 5 January 1942, at a joint session of the Central Committee Politburo, the GKO and Hq SHC the question was discussed of carrying out a general winter offensive by the Soviet Army and a decision taken. In December 1943, at a similar joint session there was a thorough review of the questions of the nation's military-political situation and the plan for the 1944 winter campaign was discussed and approved.

Headquarters, being a collective body, directed the Armed Forces on the fronts of the war and the partisan movement in the enemy rear. It carried out its decisions through the General Staff, the chief commands of the strategic sectors (1941-1942), the representatives of Hq SHC, the directorates of the people's commissariats of defense and the Navy, the Central Partisan Movement Staff and other bodies.

The General Staff was the main operational and creative body of the Soviet Supreme High Command. Its structure, tasks and work methods in the course of the war were repeatedly adjusted and improved. At the very outset of the war it underwent a significant reorganization, the main aims of which were to bring its activities as close as possible to solving operational and strategic problems and to free it of other functions not directly related to leadership of the military operations. The General Staff turned over to the appropriate directorates the functions of forming and training the reserves, the training of draft reinforcements, leadership over the interior districts and so forth. After the reorganization, the role and effectiveness of the General Staff were significantly increased. This was also largely aided by the fact that the Chief of the General Staff was also a member of Headquarters and had the right in the necessary instances to issue orders on behalf of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In essence, the General Staff was involved in working out proposals on all the main questions comprising the competence of Headquarters and coordinated the efforts of all the military departments in supporting the combat activities of the Armed Forces. The People's Commissariat of Defense, the People's Commissariat of the Navy and the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement were also important elements in the strategic leadership system.

The People's Commissariat of Defense [NKO] held the leading place. With the outbreak of the war its organizational structure was constantly improved. I. V. Stalin was appointed the people's commissar of defense. The commanders

of the Armed Services and the chiefs (commanders) of the branches of troops as well as certain chiefs of the main directorates were given broad powers and were deputy people's commissars of defense for the type of their activity.

The People's Commissariat of the Navy underwent less reorganization in comparison with the NKD. The people's commissar of the Navy was a member of Headquarters and was directly under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Holding a special place in the system of the SHC were: the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy and these functioned as sections of the VKP(b) Central Committee. The activities of these directorates were aimed chiefly at increasing the level of party political work in the aim of strengthening Armed Forces morale, military discipline, order and organization in the units and on the ships, at mobilizing the personnel to carry out the combat missions and indoctrinating the men in a spirit of hate for the enemies of the socialist fatherland, loyalty to the motherland, to the cause of the Communist Party and in a spirit of internationalism.

Hq SHC directed the partisan struggle through the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement, the work of which was carried out in accord with the decisions of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the GKO decrees in close contact with the leading party bodies of the republics and oblasts, the military councils of the fronts and armies.

Holding an important place in the system of strategic leadership were the main commands of the strategic sectors, the Main Command in the Far East, as well as the representatives of Hq SHC. The appearance of this command element was caused by the desire of the SHC to bring strategic leadership closer to the operational army and on the spot coordinate the actions of the fronts carrying out a common strategic task. As a whole, the incorporation of such a command element in the system of strategic leadership was a new phenomenon in Soviet military art and proved effective.

In the Great Patriotic War as combat experience was gained, the methods of strategic leadership were improved. They provided a rational combination of the Leninist principles of collectivism and on-man responsibility for the assigned work areas and decisions taken.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief met personally with the commanders of the fronts by summoning them to Headquarters or talked with them by telephone or telegraph and during these times the plans for operations were clarified. Summonses of the commanders of the fronts to Headquarters were alternated by their submitting of operational plans to the General Staff. The decisions taken by Headquarters were issued to executors in the form of directives and orders signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the chief of the General Staff. The final word at Headquarters, of course, belonged to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin. He took the final decision for the carrying out of each operation.

As a whole, strategic leadership over the Armed Forces was characterized by a creative approach to the solution of the problems confronting the SHC. Each

time those methods and forms of combat operations were chosen which conformed most fully to the existing situation and ensured the most dependable path to victory. The defensive in 1941-1943 was skillfully combined with a counteroffensive (at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk). A strategic offensive was carried out by conducting a series of successive strategic offensive operations (1943-1944) or by the simultaneous launching of a series of strong attacks along the entire Soviet-German Front (1945). This ensured the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht and the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.

Clear indicators of the high level of Soviet strategic leadership during the years of the Great Patriotic War were the correct choice of the axes of the main thrust and the skillful massing of men and weapons. The art of choosing the axis of the main thrust considering the political, economic and military factors was manifested in the desire of Headquarters to launch it against the most important enemy grouping and to find the most vulnerable places in it. Thus, in 1941, our main efforts were concentrated on the Moscow sector, in the winter campaign of 1942-1943, at Stalingrad (on the southwestern sector), in the summer-autumn campaign at Kursk and the Ukraine, in 1944, in Belorussia, and in 1945, on the Berlin sector.

An important means by which Headquarters actively influenced the course of the campaigns and operations was the strategic reserves. At the outset of the war they played an important role in stabilizing the front and checking the enemy offensive plans. Subsequently, the SHC used them chiefly for creating assault groupings and increasing the effort in the course of offensive operations.

The experience gained in strategic leadership during the years of the Great Patriotic War is of lasting importance. In its activities the Soviet SHC relied firmly on the objective capabilities residing in the socialist system of our state. Strategic leadership was organized on a Leninist basis with a high degree of centralization combined with strict collectivism and the strict observance of the principle of the unity of political, state and military leadership.

Under present-day conditions, the demands on the system of strategic leadership and on increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the Armed Forces have increased immeasurably. "In the difficult international situation," as was emphasized at the March (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "as never before, it is important to maintain the defense capability of our motherland on a level so that the potential aggressors are well aware that encroachment on the security of the Soviet nation and its allies or on the peaceful life of the Soviet people will encounter a crushing retaliatory strike."(4)

As a whole, the Soviet system of strategic leadership during the years of the Great Patriotic War proved its indisputable superiority over the strategic leadership of the bourgeois armies. The experience of the war is a rich basis for reflection and for the creative employment of it under present-day conditions.

#### FOOTNOTES

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CSO: 1801/304

## DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ART, TACTICS IN YEARS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 38-42

[Article by Army Gen G. I. Obaturov, chief of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze]

[Text] The Soviet Army entered the Great Patriotic War with a **theory of a deep operation** which had been worked out and tested in the course of exercises and actual combat on Lake Khasan, the Khalkhin-Gol River and in the Soviet-Finnish military conflict.

During the war years around 250 front-level operations and more than 1,000 army-level operations were carried out, largely offensive ones.(1) They all confirmed the correctness of the main provisions of this theory. With the increased effectiveness of the combat equipment and weapons, with the improvement in the organizational structure of the troops and the change in the nature of enemy combat, the theory of the deep operation underwent development. The practice of the war enriched it with many new provisions.

The successfully conducted offensive operations were marked by the **skillful choice of the axis of the main thrust** which was launched predominantly against the weak point in the enemy defenses, on terrain permitting the use of all the branches of troops and primarily the tank and mechanized ones, and on axes bringing the attack groupings of the troops in deep or against the flanks and rear of the main enemy groupings. In a number of operations, with great superiority in resources and large tank and mechanized formations available, the main thrust was launched against strong enemy groupings.

The **massing of men and weapons** was skillfully carried out by the maximum weakening of the secondary sectors, by employing artillery from the second echelons and by maneuvering the air groupings with a deep operational configuration of the troops on the axes of the thrusts. Due to this, in the breakthrough sectors which comprised from 6-7 to 15-25 percent of the total width of the zone of advance of the fronts, there were concentrated 40-50 percent and more of the rifle formations, up to 90 percent of the artillery, from 60 to 80 percent of the tanks and virtually all the artillery; in the armies on breakthrough sectors from 6 to 14 km they employed 70-80 percent of the men and weapons. This made it possible to achieve a 3-5-fold superiority

over the enemy in artillery and tanks and ensured the launching of a powerful initial thrust.(2)

With an increased depth of the enemy operational defenses, in the second and third periods of the war, **the operational configuration of the troops of the fronts and armies** also underwent significant changes. A qualitative strengthening of the elements of the operational configuration and the appearance of new ones became a general trend in its development. For achieving a high rate of advance, along with establishing strong second echelons as echelons for exploiting the success, mobile groups also began to be employed. On the fronts these included tank armies, separate tank and mechanized corps and one or two horse-mechanized groups while in the armies there were one and sometimes two tank (mechanized) corps. The army and front artillery and antiaircraft artillery groups became stronger and stronger. Strong reserves of all branches of troops were established. The mobile obstacle construction detachments became an obligatory element in the operational configuration. All of this made it possible to constantly increase the effort and maintain superiority over the enemy on the axes of the thrusts to the entire depth of the operations.

Soviet military art during the war years solved the problem of **organizing and breaking through the strong deeply echeloned enemy defenses**. While in the first period of the war it took 2 or 3 days to break through a tactical defensive zone just 3-4 km deep, in the third period, regardless of its increased depth to 12 km and more, the breakthrough was carried out in 2 days and in a whole series of operations in a single day.

This was largely caused by the successful solution to the **problem of fire damage to the enemy**. Soviet theory and practice found the artillery and air offensive as a form for continuous, massed fire damage to the enemy. There was a clearly expressed tendency to increase the depth of the simultaneous fire damage during the period of the artillery and air softening up for the attack. This had increased from 2.5-5 km at the beginning of the war to 8-10 km by its end. During the third period, as the densities of artillery and air strikes increased, it became shorter.(3) The methods of the artillery support for the attack were improved. During operations of the first period of the war, this was carried out by the successive concentration of fire and subsequently by a rolling barrage (single or double) with a simultaneous increase in its depth from 1-1.5 km to 5 km. The effectiveness of the fire support for the troops deep in the enemy defenses was increased. The density of bomb strikes in breaking through the defenses during individual operations of the third period of the war increased from 20 to 100 tons per km<sup>2</sup> of target area.(4)

An important factor in increasing the rate of breaking through the enemy defenses and developing the offensive in depth was the **prompt build-up of the efforts of the troops**. A new step in carrying out this task was the broad use of **army and front mobile groups**. The moment of committing them to battle was skillfully determined by the commanders. In order not to allow a drop in the pace, the army mobile groups were committed to battle on the first or second day of an operation, often for completing the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone. The mobile groups of the fronts were also partially used at



times for carrying out this mission. This made it possible to complete the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone at a high rate and without a pause and rapidly develop the offensive in depth. In moving forward, the mobile groups routed the enemy reserves which were being moved up, without a halt captured sectors on the defensive lines, thwarted the enemy attempts to dig in on them, they established internal and external perimeters of encirclement and destroyed the encircled groupings and also disrupted command and the work of the enemy rear.

In exploiting the success an important role was assigned to the **second echelons**. As a rule, an army second echelon was committed for breaking through the army or intermediate defensive line, the second echelon of a front after breaking through the army line and sometimes even in the final stage of a front operation, as occurred on the First Ukrainian Front in the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation.

The increase in the pace and depth of pursuing the enemy determined the skillful exploitation of the offensive's success in depth. While during the first period of the war the rate of pursuit reached 8-12 km a day, in the second and particularly in the third, it increased significantly and began to be 25-30 km per day and more for the rifle formations and 40-50 km a day for the armored and mechanized formations. In a majority of the offensive operations in the third period of the war, pursuit was carried out along the entire zone of the front (army) to a depth of 150-250 km and more.(5)

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the art of **preparing and conducting defensive operations** increased. Starting with the second period of the war, the defensive became capable of stopping attacks by strong enemy groupings. An important factor in increasing the strength and activity of the defenses was the improving of their configuration. At the outset of the war, the fronts and armies went over to the defensive in very wide areas. A front defended an area from 300 to 600 km wide and an army from 70 to 200 km.(6) With a shortage of men and weapons, this forced the commanders to form up their field forces in a single echelon with the assigning of small reserves.

In the second period, particularly from the summer of 1943, there was a significant narrowing of the defensive areas: to 250-350 km for the fronts and to 40-80 km for the armies.(7) Along with an increase in the number of troops of the fronts and armies, the narrowing of the areas provided an opportunity to strengthen all the elements of the operational configuration, particularly the second echelons of the fronts; tank armies also began to appear in them (the Kursk Battle). The increased combat capabilities made it possible to skillfully mass the men and weapons on the probable sectors of the enemy advance.

The change in the operational configuration of the fronts and armies led to the establishing of a **very deep echeloned defense** which in the battle at Kursk included five-six defensive lines 150-180 km deep.(8) The density of the man-made obstacles also increased. All of this immeasurably increased the strength of the defenses. **The activity of the defensive** rose sharply. This was expressed primarily in the more dependable fire hitting of the enemy, in the extensive maneuvering of the men and weapons as well as in the launching

of counterstrikes. An important form of activity and a means for hitting the enemy were the artillery and air counterbombardment carried out on a scale of not only the army but also the front. Counterbombardment caused significant losses to the enemy, it held up the start of its offensive and weakened the strength of the initial strike (the Kursk Battle).

The role of the maneuvering of men and weapons grew. This began to be employed not only from depth but also very often from unattacked areas. The amount of men and weapons involved in a maneuver increased. Thus, in the area of the Voronezh Front, from 5 through 15 July 1943, seven tank and mechanized corps, ten rifle divisions, six tank brigades, five antitank brigades and nine artillery regiments were regrouped and committed to battle on the sector of the enemy's main thrust.(9)

Thus, in the course of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet operational art developed constantly. It showed its full superiority over the art of the Nazi Army.

On the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War the tactics of the Soviet troops underwent a thorough check and showed its maturity. It was enriched by the art of concentrating the efforts of the branches of troops and special troops for achieving the goals of combat, by a creative approach to determining the combat missions and the configuration of the battle formations, by the skillful organization of fire and by the employment of methods for the concealed concentration of troops and a surprise going over to the attack. Battles assumed a more dynamic nature due to extensive maneuvering on the battlefield, the use of forward detachments for rapidly shifting efforts in depth and continuous troop actions during the day and at night.

Major changes also occurred in the preparation and conduct of offensive combat which was the basic type of combat for the Soviet troops. Under the conditions of solid fronts during the war years the main problem was the rapid breaking through of the enemy tactical defensive zone which increased constantly in depth and strength of resistance. The carrying out of this mission was achieved by the joint efforts of all the branches of troops, aviation and special troops, and for this reason combat once and for all assumed all the traits of all-arms combat in which the leading role was assigned to the reinforced all-arms units and formations.

More creativity was shown in determining the combat missions for the troops. In breaking through the deeply echeloned defenses, separate missions were set for the all-arms formations for the immediate and subsequent task and the task of the day. This made it possible to more effectively set the sequence for defeating the enemy on the defensive and contributed to the better organization of cooperation and troop command in the course of combat.

Simultaneously, as a consequence of the growing enemy defenses and the necessity of the decisive massing of men and weapons, there was a process of narrowing the width of the zone of advance for the divisions (to 1.5-2.5 km) and this brought about a further increase in the tactical densities.(10)

Substantial changes also occurred in the configuration of the troop battle formations. At the outset of the war, when there were not enough men and weapons, the deep echeloning of the troops from the company to the division did not make it possible to establish a strong first echelon. The artillery groups and groups of close support tanks were weak, while antitank reserves and mobile obstacle construction detachments were not established. With the aim of ensuring a strong initial thrust, the subunits, units and formations advanced in a single-echelon formation. With the increased depth of the enemy defenses, the single-echelon formation could no longer ensure a build-up of effort. For this reason, starting in the summer of 1943, the units and formations began to employ a deeper configuration of battle formations. The rifle divisions more and more often were formed up in two echelons, the regiments in two and sometimes three. The artillery groups from the third period of the war began to be established according to the organizational-tactical principle, that is, regimental (PAG), divisional (DAG) and corps (KAG). This increased the independence of the units and formations in fire damage to the enemy. The strength of the groups of close support tanks increased and by the war's end their density reached 20-30 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] per kilometer of breakthrough sector; their cooperation with the artillery and advancing infantry was improved.(11) The mobile obstacle construction detachment became an obligatory element in the battle formation.

The task of achieving a surprise attack began to be carried out more effectively. This was achieved mainly by bringing the line for going over to the attack closer to the forward edge of the enemy defenses and by the clear organization and concealed taking up of the jump-off position for the advance.

As experience was gained, starting in the second period of the war, the level of the organizational activities of the commanders and staffs rose to a higher level and this was reflected in the skillful organization of combat in the field. The coordinating of efforts by all the branches of troops was improved in the individual stages of combat. A more rational approach was found to organizing the command posts and these were brought as close as possible to the first echelon subunits and were echeloned in depth. Radio communications began to be more widely employed.

A major accomplishment on the defensive was the ensuring of its insurmountability. This was achieved by deep echeloning, by the tenacity of the troops in combat, by the skillful organization of all types of fire systems, by the correct choice of the defensive lines and engineer organization of the terrain, by a combination of fire with a system of man-made obstacles, firm and continuous troop command, by a well prepared maneuver and by camouflaging of the troops.

During the first period of the war, the tactical defenses which were poorly organized in engineer terms and consisted of a single area, did not possess sufficient strength. It was essential to increase its depth, establish higher densities of men and weapons and improve the engineer organization of the terrain. In the second period of the war, with the restoring of the corps element, a second area began to be established in the tactical zone. The total depth of the zone rose to 15-20 km.(12) Each area was equipped with two

or three positions with a developed system of trenches and communications trenches, shelters and man-made obstacles. The width of the defensive zone for a rifle division was reduced. This made it possible to echelon the battle formations of the formations and units to a great depth.

Dependable fire damage to the enemy began to be achieved by strengthening each element of the battle formation and the effective organization of the fire system which was based upon artillery fire combined with small-arms fire and man-made obstacles.

A fundamental improvement in antitank defenses was a major factor in increasing the strength of the defenses. For combating enemy tanks they began to employ all the branches of troops with the all-arms commander being its organizer. A characteristic feature of antitank defense was the massing of resources on likely tank approaches to the entire tactical depth. The density of antitank guns per kilometer of front rose to 7-11 and more units.(13) In addition to antitank artillery, used in fighting against the tanks were artillery positioned in covered firing positions, including antiaircraft artillery, and this strengthened the densities. A system of antitank strongpoints, centers and areas was established and developed. The mobility of the antitank reserves was significantly increased. SAU also began to be included in them. Aviation began to play an important role in repelling enemy tank attacks.

The listed measures, combined with the courage and tenacity of the troops, helped to increase the strength and activeness of the defenses and ensured their insurmountability.

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12. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 12, p 300.
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CSO: 1801/304

## GROUND FORCES IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 43-47

[Article by Col Gen D. A. Grinkevich, chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces]

[Text] The major tasks of defeating the Nazi Army were carried out on land, and the Ground Forces played the leading role here as they were the basic and most numerous Armed Service.

On the eve of the war, the Ground Forces included rifle (infantry), armored and mechanized troops, artillery and cavalry. They also included special troops such as: signals, engineer, air defense, gas defense and others. In organizational terms they were united in 303 rifle, tank, motorized and cavalry divisions, 170 of which were in the Western border military districts.(1) The all-arms army was the main operational field force of the Ground Forces.

The surprise of the invasion and the simultaneous offensive along a broad front by the major ground forces (up to 190 divisions) of Nazi Germany put the armies of the Western border districts in a difficult situation. The Soviet Army along the entire Soviet-German Front was forced to go over to the strategic defensive. Under these conditions, the enemy's main thrusts were taken by the Ground Forces and primarily the infantry which was the basis of the rifle formations and comprised over 60 percent(2) of the total number of the Ground Forces.

The first period of the war which included the defensive operations at Leningrad, Smolensk, in the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus at Stalingrad and the heroic battle for Moscow as well as the offensive operations at Tikhvin, Rostov and a number of others were not only a severe testing but also major combat schooling for the Ground Forces.

The defensive, as a consequence of the decisive enemy superiority in men and weapons, was not always capable of withstanding its strikes. However, as the depth of the defenses increased by deploying the reserve armies on the rear lines and assigning stronger second echelons and reserves for the field forces and formations and also as the troops gained combat experience, the defensive

became ever-stronger and more active. This was expressed in the maneuvering of men and weapons from the inactive areas to the threatened ones and by the carrying out of strong counterstrikes and counterattacks in the course of which the field forces and formations often not only recovered the lost position but also reversed the situation in the development of military operations on individual sectors. The command and the staffs here gained experience in organizing and conducting offensive actions. Often the counterstrikes by the Soviet troops developed into an offensive along a broad front (at Tikhvin and Rostov). This was most visibly apparent in the counteroffensive at Moscow which then developed into a general offensive.

In the course of the offensive operations, many of which the Ground Forces conducted while inferior to the enemy in men and weapons, the principle of the massing of resources on the sectors of the main thrusts underwent further development. The methods of fire damage to the enemy were also improved.

Proceeding from the experience of the first engagements, the condition of the Ground Forces and a number of other factors, the organizational structure of the Ground Forces was constantly improved. In particular, during the first period the mechanized corps and tank divisions were broken up. In the place of the cumbersome, difficult-to-control armies which consisted of 4-5 rifle corps and 1 or 2 mechanized corps (a total of from 13 to 21 divisions) and 1-3 air divisions, armies were organized with 5 or 6 divisions without a corps command level. Such an organizational structure for the Ground Forces field forces during that period corresponded to the situational conditions and to our capabilities.

In the Smolensk Engagement, the Soviet guard was established, grew up and became stronger. Field forces of the Ground Forces were among the first to receive the title of guards for courage and valor in battle, tenacity and heroism, discipline and organization; these included the 100th, 127th, 153d and 161st Rifle Divisions.(3)

High combat maturity and the ability to defeat the enemy were shown by the ground forces in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, in the battles on the Kursk Salient, on the Dnieper and in a number of other operations during the second period of the war. During this period work was continued on organizational measures. The increased level of technical equipping of the Ground Forces, the increase in the effective strength of the all-arms armies and the incorporation in them of a significant number of individual units and formations brought about the restoration of the corps command level. An army now included two-three rifle corps (six-nine divisions), as well as cannon, antitank, antiaircraft artillery and mortar regiments.(4) In addition, an army fighting on the axis of the main thrust of a front was reinforced with one or two tank or mechanized corps. This greatly increased its combat capabilities and gave greater independence in carrying out operational missions. The saturating of the operational army with tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mounts] created opportunities to organize large tank and mechanized formations and field forces.

The increased production of guns and mortars made it possible to switch to the establishing of artillery breakthrough divisions and corps, cannon artillery divisions, antitank artillery brigades and howitzer destruction brigades. Their employment ensured the achieving of fire superiority over the enemy and helped to build up the strength of the attack and successfully carry out operations by the Ground Forces. Air defense effectiveness was significantly increased as well as the protecting of our troops against enemy air strikes due to the establishing of army air defense regiments. In the engineer troops, separate motorized pontoon-bridge regiments were organized and this helped to increase the offensive capabilities of the formations and field forces of the Ground Forces. The other special troops were strengthened in material terms and underwent further development and this improved the quality and the effectiveness of all-round support for combat operations.

In the third period of the war, the Ground Forces were significantly strengthened and had gained great combat experience. The combat skill of the personnel and the maturity of the command personnel had risen. The organizational structure of the field forces and formations underwent further improvement and began to more fully conform to the nature of the missions being carried out.

For breaking through enemy defenses they began to employ a strong artillery offensive whereby the densities approached 250-300 guns and mortars as well as 20-30 and more tanks and SAU per kilometer of breakthrough sector.(5) The increased effort and the success of the offensive were ensured by a deep configuration of the battle formations for the rifle divisions and corps, by continuous and powerful fire effect against the enemy and by the clear coordination of all branches of troops.

The formations and units of the Ground Forces demonstrated high combat skill in crossing water obstacles without a pause. The enemy did not succeed in checking our advance on any of them. Nighttime combat was also successfully carried out.

Important factors in the successful conduct of operations by the Ground Forces field forces were their close cooperation with the other Armed Services, the increased level of the professional training of commanders and staffs and the combat skill of the personnel and their high combat morale qualities. The achieving of success in the operations was also aided by the concealment of preparations and the surprise of actions, the strict observance of military secrecy, the skillful implementation of surprise and deception measures and the confusing of the enemy on the time and axes of the main thrusts.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, the Ground Forces achieved a high degree of development. Thus, by its end the number of troops had almost doubled. Their technical equipping had fundamentally changed. The number of guns and mortars in the operational army had increased by almost 3-fold, new types of tanks by 7-10-fold, and machine pistols by approximately 30-fold. There was a sharp increase in the number of antitank weapons. As a whole, the weaponry of the troops was more than 80 percent modernized.(6) Here many types of weapons and combat equipment surpassed the foreign ones in their properties.



The saturating of the Ground Forces with armored and vehicular equipment and the active equipping of the rifle troops with this marked the beginning to the bringing closer together of the rifle and tank formations in terms of attack, fire and maneuvering capabilities. This ensured the ability of the rifle troops in a number of instances to carry out independently the main tasks both on the defensive and on the offensive.

The tank and mechanized troops were the main attack force of the Ground Forces. Their employment was an indispensable condition for success in an operation. The close support tanks, in fighting in the first echelon along with the rifle troops, by their powerful armored ram broke through the enemy defenses while the major tank and mechanized formations and the tank field forces committed to battle developed the tactical success into an operational one. In fighting deep in the enemy defenses, they crushed the enemy reserves, they surrounded and destroyed large groupings and captured operationally and strategically important lines and areas.

During the war years, the artillery was the main fire force of the Ground Forces. This showed its superiority over enemy artillery both in terms of combat capabilities and in terms of the art of combat employment. During the war years, the rocket artillery proved itself to be a particularly promising type of weapon and this became a terror for the enemy. The winning of fire supremacy was a most important prerequisite for the success of the operations carried out.

The engineer troops made a major contribution to achieving the goals of an operation. Their construction of engineer fortifications and obstacles and the mining of terrain helped to increase the strength of our defenses. In offensive operations the engineer formations and units conducted engineer reconnaissance, they cut passages through enemy minefields, ensured the crossing of enemy man-made obstacles and water barriers, they participated in the storming of fortifications and in reinforcing our lines and supported the repelling of enemy counterattacks and counterstrikes. Over the war years, the motorization of the engineer troops was significantly increased, they were reinforced with new equipment and due to this their combat capabilities and the effectiveness of engineer support for combat and an operation were increased.

In the war years the air defense troops played a substantial role in carrying out combat missions. They not only were ready to defend the personnel but also took a direct part in combat. The signal troops in the war years carried out important tasks to ensure command and control. They were almost completely rearmed with new equipment and modernized in organizational terms.

Many field forces and formations of the Ground Forces covered their colors with undying glory. During the war years, 11 all-arms and 6 tank armies, 67 rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, 145 divisions as well as a large number of individual units became guards units.(7) The field forces, formations and units which distinguished themselves in operations and battles were given high state decorations. Of all the Heroes of the Soviet Union who received this high title during the war years, around 80 percent were representatives of the Ground Forces.(8)

The combat experience gained by our Armed Forces during the years of the last war is truly invaluable. Gained by the blood of many millions of people, it now is of lasting significance for the further development and improvement of the Ground Forces. Having incorporated all the best and most advanced, they have moved far forward in their harmonious development and have gained a qualitatively new appearance and even greater independence.

At present, the troops are armed with the most diverse weapons. The armored, artillery, engineer and other combat equipment has undergone further development. There has been the extensive introduction of effective reconnaissance and electronic warfare equipment and automated systems for controlling the troops and weapons. At present, operational-tactical missiles, powerful long-range and self-propelled artillery and army aviation comprise the basis of the fire power of the Ground Forces. These weapons are capable of launching nuclear fire strikes to a significant depth, with great precision and in a short time. The combat capabilities of the formations and units have been sharply increased. For example, an artillery salvo of a present-day motorized rifle division equals the salvo of 30 prewar divisions. Here the power of nuclear warheads has not been taken into account.(9)

At present, the Ground Forces as before remain the most numerous Armed Service. Their role has not declined. There is no doubt that the Ground Forces will remain the basis for the strategic and operational troop groupings in the continental theaters of operations under today's conditions. Precisely they play the crucial role in completing the defeat of the enemy and in reinforcing the end results of the operations conducted.

In conclusion, we would like to point out that at present military history science has still not sufficiently profoundly and thoroughly brought out the role and place of the Ground Forces in the system of the Soviet Armed Forces and their crucial contribution to defeating the Nazi Army in the Great Patriotic War.

#### FOOTNOTES

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## AIR FORCES IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 47-50

[Article by Col Gen Avn V. Ye. Pankin, chief of the Air Forces Main Staff]

[Text] The victory in the Great Patriotic War was achieved by the joint actions of all the Armed Services. The main efforts of the Soviet Air Forces were aimed at defeating the enemy in conducting combat jointly with the Ground Forces and the Navy. The decisiveness of the aims of the operations carried out by the opposing sides determined the intense, uncompromising nature of the unprecedented air battle in history which occurred along the Soviet-German Front. Precisely here occurred the major air battles and engagements of World War II in the course of which the Nazi Luftwaffe suffered a crushing defeat.

The Soviet pilots, regardless of the complexity of the developing situation at the outset of the war, demonstrated high air skills, valor and heroism. On 22 June 1941, some 16 times they rammed aircraft with the Nazi swastika on the fuselages. Pilots M. P. Zhukov, S. I. Zdorovtsev and P. T. Kharitonov were the first in the Great Patriotic War to receive the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Air Forces in the war carried out three main missions: winning strategic air supremacy, air support and covering of the ground forces and navy and the conduct of air reconnaissance. Periodically Soviet aviation also attacked installations in the deep enemy rear.

**The struggle for strategic air supremacy** was a component and inseparable part of all armed combat on the Soviet-German Front, a primary task of the Soviet Air Forces and one of the indispensable conditions for the successful conduct of operations. More than 35 percent of the total number of aircraft sorties was spent on carrying out this mission by the frontal [tactical] aviation alone. This was carried out under the leadership of Hq SHC in the interests of the war as a whole.

The most important stages in the struggle for strategic air supremacy were the battles of Moscow and Leningrad, the air engagements over the Kuban and the Kursk Battle. In the skies of Moscow, Soviet aviation for the first time won operational air supremacy, dispelling the myth of the invincibility of the

Nazi Luftwaffe. As a whole over the 2 years of fierce and uncompromising combat the Soviet pilots in air battles and engagements as well as at airfields destroyed 35,700 enemy aircraft. For comparison the following figures might be given: the U.S. and English Air Forces over this period knocked out a little more than 10,000 aircraft, that is, 3.5-fold less.

During the most intense years of the struggle for air supremacy, the Soviet aviation industry produced around 60,000 combat aircraft while Nazi Germany produced a little more than 39,000.(1) The constant expansion of military production provided an opportunity to continuously increase the number of combat aircraft in the operational army and to change the balance of air forces in our favor. Starting in November 1942, the Soviet Air Forces in terms of their fighting strength significantly surpassed the Nazi Air Forces not only in quantitative terms but also qualitative ones.

The following data show the results of the struggle and the constant decline in the effective strength of the Nazi Air Forces on the Soviet-German Front. While before the start of the attack on the USSR, Nazi Germany had around 5,000 combat aircraft, in November 1942 the figure was 3,500 and in July 1943, just 2,980. In the Soviet Army and Navy, the aircraft fleet of the operational forces constantly increased. At the end of 1942, it numbered around 4,500 aircraft and in the summer of 1943, over 10,000.(2)

With the winning of strategic air supremacy, favorable conditions were established for the Soviet Armed Forces to carry out major strategic offensive operations simultaneously on several sectors while the Air Forces could more decisively mass their forces and conduct continuous offensive actions. Enemy aviation, forced to significantly curtail its activity, up to the end of the war was unable to provide effective support for its troops, to securely cover them in operations as well as carry out raids to objectives deep in our nation's rear.

In the Battle of Kursk, the Nazi Army went over to a strategic defensive not only on the ground but also in the air. This was confirmed by the change in the proportional amount of the branches of aviation. While at the outset of the war bombers comprised 52 percent of the German Air Force and fighters were only 32 percent of the aircraft fleet, by the end of 1944, the number of bombers had declined by 4-fold and fighters had increased by more than 2-fold and were 68 percent of the total fighting strength. In the Soviet Air Forces there was the reverse process. At the outset of the war, the bombers and ground attack planes comprised 41.2 percent of the frontal aviation while on 1 January 1943, they were more than 60 percent, including the PO-2 aircraft.(3) The fighting strength of the Air Forces assumed an offensive nature. Attack forces became their backbone.

Soviet military art during the war years successfully resolved the questions of the combat employment of the Air Forces in offensive operations by fronts and groups of fronts. While in a majority of the offensive operations of 1941-1942, air combat came down chiefly to brief air sortening up for an attack, from 1942, an air offensive began to be widely employed. Arising in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, it subsequently became an inseparable part of all the offensive operations.

Air actions in encirclement operations merit particular attention. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, in the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Iasi-Kishinev, Belorussian, Berlin and other ones, our Air Forces gained experience in organizing and instituting an all-round multizonal air blockade and in flexibly maneuvering the air field forces and formations for repelling enemy counterstrikes on the internal and external perimeters of encirclement and massed employment of aviation to eliminate the groupings.

The experience of the combat employment of long-range aviation showed that its main efforts in the war were aimed at defeating Nazi troop groupings in offensive and defensive operations and this conformed to the demands of the situation and to the nature of armed combat. Some 40.4 percent of all the aircraft sorties were employed for carrying out this task, 30.6 percent for attacking enemy lines of communications and reserves and 9.6 percent against airfields.

On the basis of a thorough analysis of air combat, operational art of the Air Forces worked out the most effectively forms and methods of Air Forces combat operations. The basic forms for employing the air field forces, formations and units were: daily combat operations within the front offensive and defensive operations, air operations, air engagements and battles.

Regardless that the main damage to Nazi aviation was caused by the operational Air Forces within the operations of the fronts, **air operations** were a very effective form of fighting enemy aviation. These were carried out, as a rule, prior to the start of strategic operations and had a substantial impact on their outcome. Thus, an important role in the developing struggle for air supremacy prior to the start of the Battle of Kursk was played by an air operation conducted upon instructions of Hq SHC on 6-8 May 1943. Involved in it were six air armies (1st, 15th, 16th, 2d, 17th and 8th) along a front of 1,200 km. In the course of the operation, Soviet pilots with small losses knocked out over 500 enemy aircraft which was 25 percent of the initial fighting strength. With the winning of strategic air supremacy, air operations to defeat the enemy air groupings usually were not conducted. Air operations were concentrated chiefly on supporting and covering the troops. The task of retaining air supremacy was successfully carried out by launching individual massed air strikes and by conducting air engagements and battles both within the front operations and independently.

**An air engagement** as a form of employing fighter aviation and which came into being finally in the second period of the Great Patriotic War was a new phenomenon in the operational art of the Air Forces. These engagements assumed the greatest scope in the skies of the Kuban, on the Kursk Salient and in the Berlin Offensive Operation. The following indicators show their fierce nature, scale and results. In the course of three air engagements conducted over the Kuban from 17 April through 7 June 1943, some 835 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

At the same time the methods of air combat were improved and there was a search for new tactical procedures and battle formations which would be unexpected for the enemy.

During the war years, Soviet military art drew important conclusions on the need to alter the organizational structure of the Air Forces, to move from the air forces of the fronts to air armies and establish strong air reserves. As a total over the war years, some 17 air armies of frontal aviation and 1 of long-range aviation were organized. The establishing of air armies as major air operational field forces was a new area in the organizational development of the Soviet Air Forces. The existing organizational structure of the frontal aviation and long-range aviation in the course of the war proved completely effective.

From the very outset of the war, Hq SHC needed to have major reserve air forces in its hands. Combat practice confirmed the advisability of establishing uniform air corps and divisions of the Reserve of Hq SHC [RVGK]. From the autumn of 1942 until the war's end, 30 air corps and 27 separate air divisions of the RVGK were organized.

The Air Forces of the Soviet Army during the years of the Great Patriotic War made 3,124,000 combat aircraft sorties and destroyed at airfields and in the air some 48,000 of the 57,000 enemy aircraft put out of commission by Soviet aviation on the Soviet-German Front. More than 600 air rammings were made, 34 pilots employed a ram twice and Hero of the Soviet Union A. S. Khlobystov three times.

The role of the Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War was set out most comprehensively in the Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief No 51 of 19 August 1945: "In the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany, our aviation honorably carried out its duty to the motherland. The glorious aces of our fatherland in fierce air engagements defeated the much touted German aviation thereby contributing to the freedom of actions for the Red Army.... Along with all the Red Army they dealt crushing blows to the enemy, destroying its personnel and equipment. The skillful actions of our valorous aviation contributed constantly to the success of the ground forces and helped achieve a final defeat of the enemy.... The Soviet people, the victor-people, are legitimately proud of the combat glory of their pilots."

The motherland had high regard for the combat achievements of the Air Forces personnel. During the war years some 288 air formations, units and subunits were transformed into guards ones, 897 received combat orders and 708 received honorific designators. Around 198,000 men received orders and medals, 2,332 persons received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including 61 two and three times.

The Air Forces produced prominent military leaders such as A. A. Novikov, P. F. Zhigarev, A. Ye. Golovanov, G. A. Vorozheykin, F. Ya. Falaleyev, S. A. Khudyakov, N. S. Skripko, K. A. Vershinin, S. I. Rudenko, S. A. Krasovskiy and others. An entire galaxy of outstanding modern pilots and navigators was produced. These included A. I. Pokryshkin, I. N. Kozhedub, A. N. Yefimov, N. M. Skomorokhov, I. S. Polbin, L. I. Beda, A. Ya. Brandys, I. A. Vorobyev, G. F. Sivkov, A. I. Molodchiy, V. N. Osipov, P. A. Taran, V. V. Senko, N. D. Gulayev, G. A. Rechkalov, F. V. Khimich, Amet-Khan Sultan and many others.

We can look back with legitimate pride on the distance covered. The rich experience in the operational-strategic employment of the Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War was the basis for the further development of the theory and practice of the employment of aviation in modern operations.

The increased combat capabilities of aviation and the higher accuracy of modern weapons have confronted us with a number of new key problems in employing the Air Forces in operations. We see these problems and are constantly concerned with their theoretical elaboration and practical testing of the research results in exercises.

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CSO: 1801/304



## OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF NAVY IN GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 51-54

[Article by Adm P. N. Navoytsev, first deputy chief of the Navy Main Staff]

[Text] In the Accountability Report to the Eighth RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress on 18 March 1918, V. I. Lenin pointed out that "the ruling class, the proletariat, only if it wants to rule and will rule, should show this also by its military organization." (1) Being guided by this wise statement, the Communist Party has constantly given and does give great attention to the organizational development of the Armed Forces, including the Navy.

By the start of the war, as a result of the measures initiated, the Soviet Navy in terms of its size and effective strength, the theoretical and practical development of naval art and the level of personnel training, was capable of "conducting combat operations both together with the ground forces and also independently in the seas adjacent to our coast chiefly in the aims of the defense of our coast and interdicting enemy sea shipments." (2) The Navy included four operational forces: the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Fleets, as well as the Danube, Caspian, Pinsk and Amur Naval Flotillas. It included 3 ships of the line, 7 cruisers, 54 destroyers, 22 patrol boats, 80 minesweepers, 287 torpedo boats, 212 submarines, 2,581 aircraft of all types and more than 1,000 coastal artillery guns with a caliber up to 406 mm. (3)

On the eve of the war the combat readiness of the fleets was high. This was aided by introducing, with the outbreak of World War II, the working on training missions year-round as well as a system for shifting the naval forces to a higher level of operational readiness according to special signals. In the aim of better employing the fleet forces, measures were carried out to improve the command and control of the fleet forces and the Navy as a whole. Due to these and other measures, with the rise of an immediate threat of aggression, all the fleets and flotillas were promptly brought to higher combat readiness and the possible difficult consequences of a surprise Nazi air strike against the naval bases were prevented.

From the very first day of the war, the fleets and flotillas initiated combat operations of an offensive nature, combining these with the execution of defensive measures. Thus, the surface vessels and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet launched tangible strikes against the military industrial installations and oil fields of Royal Romania which was allied with Nazi Germany. Submarines from the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, according to the prewar plans, set to sea to seek out and destroy enemy combat ships and transports. Airplanes from the Baltic Fleet along with army aviation made powerful strikes against airfields where enemy air formations were readying to make a massed raid against Leningrad. The Northern Fleet aviation attacked centers of enemy lines of communications in the area of Petsamo, Kirkenes. The Danube Flotilla on the very fourth day of the war landed troops which captured the southern bank of the Danube from Izmail to Periprava, a distance of 76 km. Ships from the Pinsk Flotilla on the Western Bug River caused harm to the advancing enemy.

In August-September 1941, aircraft from the Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation, in response to enemy attempts to bomb Moscow, made raids on Berlin, dropping 36 tons of bombs, as well as leaflet bombs.(4)

The main aims of the Great Patriotic War were achieved in bloody engagements on the land front. This basically also determined the nature of the operational-strategic employment of the Navy. The situation which developed on the Soviet-German Front with the outbreak of the war and the further development of events confronted the fleet primarily with the task of **direct support** for the Ground Forces of the Soviet Army on the coastal sectors. This task was to remain one of the most important in the course of the entire war.

Naval support for the troops of the Soviet Army during the first period of the war was expressed in the organizing and conduct of defenses for naval bases, port cities and coastal territories and islands along with the ground forces, in artillery support for the maritime flanks of the ground troops, in landing amphibious forces, in repelling the landing of enemy forces as well as in the broad employment of naval aviation in support for the ground forces. The aviation from the three Western fleets for these purposes made over 70,000 aircraft sorties.(5)

During the first period of the war the need arose to defend Murmansk, Liyepaya, Tallinn, Khanko, the Moonzund Islands, Odessa, Sevastopol, Kerch, Novorossiysk and Tuapse. The fleet together with units of the Soviet Army tied down and destroyed large enemy forces and helped to check the advance of the Nazis on the maritime sectors. This was of operational-strategic significance since it directly influenced the thwarting of the plans for a "blitzkrieg." Thus, the Northern Fleet, in supporting the 14th Army defending on the Murmansk sector, to a large degree helped it check the advance of the Nazi Army Norway. The defense of Odessa for more than 2 months held up large forces of the Romanian Army while the defense of Sevastopol for more than 8 months tied down a significant enemy grouping in the Crimea. Forces from the Black Sea Fleet contributed to the success of defensive actions of the Soviet Army in the Northern Caucasus. The Baltic Fleet played a major role in the defense of Leningrad, maintaining a firm hold on the Oranienbaum beachhead and also supplied the city and the front over the Lifeline across Lake Ladoga.

Of great importance in the course of the war was the landing of amphibious forces by fleet and flotilla forces. In 1941-1942, when our troops were conducting strategic defensive operations, the fleets landed some 40 landing forces. At that time the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet conducted the major Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation in the course of which two armies were landed on the Kerch Peninsula and the threat of the enemy capture of Sevastopol was eliminated for 6 months. In 1943-1945, the fleets landed 73 amphibious forces(6) which contributed largely to the ground forces in breaking through enemy defenses on the maritime sectors, in maintaining high rates of advance and destroying enemy groupings pressed to the sea. The Northern Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet landed a force in Novorossiysk and this marked the beginning of the elimination of the Taman enemy beachhead while the Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation ensured the capturing of an operational bridgehead in the Crimea, where the Maritime Army was concentrated. As a total over the war, the fleets and flotillas landed over 250,000 men with combat equipment and weapons.

In the combat operations of the fleet during the entire war an important place was held by **troop movements and the defense of our searoutes**. These assumed particular importance in the Northern Fleet. The shortest and most convenient link with the Allies ran via the ports of the White Sea and the Kolskiy Zaliv and in addition major movements were carried out of important military, national economic cargo and strategic raw materials from the ports of Northern Siberia and the Far East. The Black Sea searoutes were vitally important during the period of the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol and the Northern Caucasus as well as in the course of the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation. Their normal functioning ensured the combat stability of the troops in the course of defensive operations. During the preparations and conduct of the front-level and army-level offensive operations in 1943-1945, the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Flotilla largely transported the troops by sea and up the Danube.

Responsible missions were also carried out by the Baltic Fleet, the Ladoga and Volga Flotillas in supplying blockaded Leningrad across Lake Ladoga and ensuring the normal operation of the Volga River Line, particularly for delivering oil, fuels and lubricants to the industrial areas and to the front. The forces of the Baltic Fleet without detection by the enemy in a short period of time shifted the 2d Shock Army to the Oranienbaum beachhead.

During the entire war, the Navy transported 9.8 million men and over 94 million [?tons] of cargo over the sea, lake and river arteries.(7) These shipments were of operational-strategic significance in preparing and conducting both the defensive and offensive operations.

**Combat operations to disrupt enemy searoutes** were conducted continuously as part of carrying out the task of assisting the Soviet Army troops in fighting the Nazi occupiers. Submarines, aviation, torpedo boats and destroyers destroyed transports carrying troops, combat equipment and other cargo. Mine warfare was carried out actively.

**Systematic fleet operations** developed finally in the course of the war as a system of measures aimed at maintaining the necessary conditions in the

operational zone of the fleet. These activities were carried out continuously by diverse fleet forces. They included reconnaissance, a patrol service, air defense, ASW defense, antimining defense and antilaunch defense in the theater. All these actions required thousands of combat runs by the ships and tens of thousands of combat sorties by naval aviation. All types of defense in the theater, particularly air and antimine, significantly increased the efficient use of the fleet forces in conducting the operations.

The brief but very full combat activities of the Pacific Fleet and Amur Naval Flotilla were of operational-strategic significance in assisting the troops of the Soviet Army in defeating the Japanese Kwantung Army. Naval forces carried out rapid landing operations to capture the southern part of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and a number of ports and naval bases of the Japanese in Korea.

With the conduct of strategic offensive operations by the Soviet Army, our fleets and flotillas on the maritime, lacustrine and river sectors widely used the landing of assault forces in the rear for assisting the breakthrough of enemy defensive lines, they ensured the achieving of high rates of advance, they provided artillery and air support for their units and formations on the maritime flanks, they provided troop movements for reinforcing them as well as in maneuvering troops and equipment and provided help in crossing water barriers.

The successful use of the Navy was ensured by the following: by the development in the prewar years of a powerful shipbuilding base for creating universal forces (submarine and surface ships, aircraft, coastal artillery armed with powerful weapons) and by a sound distribution of these forces between the maritime theaters proceeding from the tasks of defending the nation against aggression; by the development of a network of naval bases in the maritime theaters and by the stockpiling of the necessary materiel in them; by the early elaboration of operational-tactical documents; by the preparation of the required amount of personnel for the fleet as well as their training and indoctrination in combat and revolutionary traditions.

The experience of the operational-strategic employment of the naval forces during the Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of the basic tenet of Soviet military doctrine: Victory in the struggle against a strong enemy is won by the common efforts of all the Armed Services in their close cooperation.

One of the essential features of leadership over the operational-strategic employment of the Navy was the combining of centralized command on the part of the Supreme High Command and in certain instances the military councils of the strategic sectors or fronts and the granting of extensive initiative to the commands of the fleets (flotillas) in controlling the actions of their subordinate forces in carrying out specific missions.

The success of the operations was largely determined by careful planning, by the organization of cooperation, by thorough preparation of the men and weapons, by special training for the personnel and complete logistical and other support.

Under present-day conditions, when the might of weapons has increased immeasurably, the questions of all-round support for naval operations and the restoring of naval battleworthiness have assumed vitally important significance.

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CSO: 1801/304

## EXPERIENCE OF ORGANIZING AIR DEFENSE DURING WAR YEARS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 55-59.

[Article by Col Gen Avn I. M. Maltsev, chief of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Troops]

[Text] The Air Defense Troops along with the other Armed Services and branches of troops made a worthy contribution toward achieving the world historical victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.

In attacking our country, the enemy began to carry out its strategic plans by launching massed attacks with large air groupings simultaneously against our troops, naval forces and most important objectives in the nation. One has merely to recall that the Nazi Command concentrated four air fleets out of the five existing in the Luftwaffe as well as the Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian aviation numbering around 5,000 combat aircraft in the eastern regions of Germany, in Poland and partially in Finland, Romania and Hungary.(1)

The combat actions of the Air Defense Troops in repelling the enemy air raids during the first hours of the war assumed unprecedented scope and fierceness. These developed along the entire western frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea and to a depth of up to 400 km.

Due to the complexity of the situation in the initial period of the war, the command of the military districts and the fronts focused chief attention on carrying out mobilization measures, on shifting the troops from a peacetime to wartime status, to preparing reserves for the operational army as well as carrying out operations to repel the offensive of the Nazi troops. In this context the missions of air defense were often shifted to the background. The antiaircraft units and subunits often were employed to fight against enemy tanks and infantry and this sometimes led to a weakening of air defense for national installations and lines of communications of the fronts.

In the difficult situation of the first months of the war, when the administrative-political centers and major economic regions of the nation ended up in the front zone, the missions of the Air Defense Troops became significantly more complex, the scope of combat increased sharply and the fight against Nazi aviation assumed an operational-strategic nature. All of

this led to the need to establish a single body for directing the entire system of national air defense and for centralizing command. The State Defense Committee [GKO] on 9 November 1941 established the position of commander of the Air Defense Troops for the Nation's Territory (first commander, Maj Gen I. S. Gromadin) and set up the necessary command bodies. The formations and units covering the administrative-political and industrial centers and regions of the Soviet Union were taken away from the military districts and fronts and put under the commander of the Air Defense Troops of the Nation's Territory. On the basis of the air defense zones, corps (Moscow, Leningrad) and divisional air defense regions were formed. The fighter aviation formations and units assigned for air defense in operational terms were put under the commander of the National Air Defense Troops and in the field under the commanders of the corps and divisional air defense regions. The logical conclusion to this reorganization was the full subordination in January 1942 of the fighter aviation assigned to cover national installations to the air defense command.

The presence of a single air defense command for the nation made it possible to most effectively employ the air defense forces on a statewide scale in accord with the requirements of the specific operational-strategic situation. Better conditions were established for a further improvement in their organizational structure and for the development of the command system. Conditions appeared for the extensive maneuvering of the Air Defense Troops to threatened sectors and for carrying out a maneuvering defense.

In the aim of carrying out the air defense tasks for major centers and regions of the nation, for successfully repelling massed enemy air strikes and providing closer cooperation between the diverse air defense forces, in April 1942, the first two air defense armies (Leningrad and Baku) and the Moscow Air Defense Front were organized.

Thus, since this time the National Air Defense Troops assumed all the main features of an independent Soviet Armed Service. In carrying out a strictly determined range of missions, they had independent command and special command bodies which were directly under the superior military leadership.

The massed enemy air raids were opposed by the combat actions of a large number of diverse National Air Defense Troops in cooperation with the troop air defenses and the fighter aviation of the fronts' air forces. These actions were coordinated in terms of targets, time and place and were strictly centralized under the leadership of the appropriate commanders of the air defense field forces. Such actions in terms of scale, the form of their organization and conduct assumed the traits of air defense operations. The effectiveness of the fight against enemy aviation increased significantly. Particularly indicative in this regard was the air defense of our capital. It was virtually insurmountable for the Nazi Air Forces. Nor did the enemy succeed in destroying Leningrad, the ships of the Baltic Fleet or interrupting the continuous operation of the Lifeline. As a total during the war years, the air defense troops covering Leningrad destroyed 1,561 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground and repelled more than 270 enemy air raids.(2

Air defense for the troops of the fronts was also improved. In the aim of centralizing its leadership, in June 1941 this air defense was put under the Artillery Chief of the Red Army, Col Gen Art N. N. Voronov. Command bodies for troop air defense were established on the artillery staff as well as in the artillery headquarters and sections of the fronts and armies. From the second half of 1942, in the troop air defenses they began organizing antiaircraft artillery regiments and divisions and these began to be reduced into antiaircraft artillery groups employed for covering the main troop groupings of the fronts, armies, corps and divisions. All of this made it possible to significantly increase the effectiveness of troop air defense. Thus, the average monthly losses of Nazi aviation from the air defense forces of the ground forces increased from 316 aircraft over the first period of the war up to 420 in the second half of 1942.

In the course of the war, experience was gained in leadership over large groupings of Air Defense Troops and the planning of their operational employment and cooperation with other Armed Services and branches of troops were improved. For example, in the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, for the first time the air defense for the troops, lines of communications and rear facilities in an operation of a group of fronts was carried out by the joint efforts of the National Air Defense Troops, the troop air defense and the fighter aviation of the front air forces according to a previously elaborated concept and plan. Prior to the start of the battle 4 divisional air defense regions with subordinate fighter air divisions (more than 200 fighters, over 760 antiaircraft guns, around 560 large-caliber antiaircraft machine guns) were concentrated for air defense of the railroad communications, the installations of the front rear and the reserves from the Air Defense Troops. For covering the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, Hq SHC concentrated 9 antiaircraft artillery divisions of the RVGK [Reserve of the Supreme High Command] and 33 separate antiaircraft artillery units which included some 1,026 antiaircraft guns.(3)

The characteristic traits of the operational employment of the air defense troops in the Kursk Battle were a deep echeloning and broad maneuvering of the men and weapons. An example of operational maneuvering would be the relocating of the regiments from the 102d Fighter Air Division from Voronezh and Kastornoye to Kursk in the aim of more successfully repelling the massed enemy air strikes. The maneuver was also carried out to protect previously uncovered railroad installations, rail heads, accumulations of trains and so forth. For this purpose, maneuvering (roaming) antiaircraft artillery groups and antiaircraft armored trains were employed. The fluid nature of air defense gave it flexibility and increased effectiveness and stability.

With the going over of the Soviet Army to a stratetic offensive, the forces of the National Air Defense Troops were employed in covering the front lines of communications, the troop groupings of the fronts, the reserves of the SHC, the supply dumps and depots as well as for increasing the air defense system behind the advancing troops. At the same time, it was essential to maintain air defense for major installations deep in the country on a proper level. This led to the need to strengthen the command bodies of the National Air Defense Troops, to centralize leadership over them in the theater of operations by establishing large operational-strategic field forces. In June



1943, two air defense fronts, the Western and Eastern, were established. The former of them covered objects and lines of communications in the frontline area while the latter provided defense for the Southern and Middle Urals, the Volga and Transcaucasus.

Because of the further advance of the Soviet Army, the greater depth of the operational configuration for the troops of the air defense fronts and the shifting of a number of air defense formations from the interior to the Baltic, Western Belorussia, Poland, Romania and Hungary created difficulties in troop command. For this reason in the aim of bringing the command bodies of the air defense fronts closer to their subordinate troops, in March 1944, the Northern, Southern and Transcaucasian Air Defense Fronts were established on the basis of the Western and Eastern Fronts. From the end of 1944, there were now four air defense fronts: Western, Southwestern, Transcaucasian and Central.

The effectiveness of the new command structure for the National Air Defense Troops was confirmed by the entire subsequent course of the war. In March 1945, the Maritime, Amur and Transbaykal Air Defense Armies were established as part of the Far Eastern and Transbaykal Fronts on the basis of the air defense zones which existed there.

The prompt built-up of the air defense system in the theater of operations was a very difficult problem during the period of the Soviet Army's strategic offensive. Initially for this purpose they drew on reserves and also the successive organization of air defense for the installations on liberated territory initially by the air defense troops of the fronts and then the formations and units of the air defense fronts. With an increase in the scope of the strategic offensive, particularly from the end of 1943, the maneuvering of the air defense forces began to be widely employed using those forces removed from installations deep in national territory which was now beyond the reach of enemy aviation. Such regroupings were carried out only upon a decision of Hq SHC.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Air Defense Troops were enriched with diverse, instructive experience in the operational employment of air defense resources and successfully carried out the missions entrusted to them. The main results of the combat activities of the National Air Defense Troops and the troop air defenses was that they, in cooperation with the air forces of the fronts, protected major industrial and administrative centers, including Moscow and Leningrad, as well as thousands of population points against destruction and annihilation by Nazi aviation, they reliably covered the troop groupings and lines of communications and provided significant aid to the Ground Forces in repelling attacks by enemy tanks and mechanized formations and assisted the Air Forces in the struggle to win air supremacy. To a significant degree they helped ensure the normal operation of industry and transport. The Air Defense Troops honorably carried out their international duty, having established an effective air defense for installations on the liberated territory of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War is truly invaluable for the Air Defense Troops. It made it possible to draw important conclusions for the theory and practice of their organizational development both during the war years as well as in the postwar period. The main ones are the following.

In the first place, during the most difficult year of the war, when Nazi aviation had air supremacy, the SHC concluded that the air defense of the state is a strategic mission and for carrying out this a strong national air defense system is required and this must be established in peacetime according to a unified concept and plan. This task can be successfully carried out only under the condition of establishing a sufficient amount of air defense resources.

Secondly, the Air Defense Troops must be constantly in high combat readiness and be developed as a Soviet Armed Service.

Thirdly, the air defense system of the nation should be established to the entire depth which can be reached by the air enemy with centralized leadership over this by the commander of the Air Defense Troops. Troop air defense, in being an inseparable part of the fronts, should be reinforced and should supplement the national air defense system. In turn, the national air defense system should increase the effort on the axes of the fronts.

Fourthly, the Air Defense Troops should have not only ground forces but also fighter aviation and should act together.

Fifthly, for strengthening the air defenses of the fronts on the main sectors in the course of an offensive and in carrying out unexpectedly arising tasks, Hq SHC should have a sufficient reserve of air defense resources.

Considering the present state and prospects for the development of the means of air attack for the United States and NATO as well as that role and importance which are given to them in achieving the strategic aims of a war, it becomes obvious that the role of the Air Defense Troops in the defense of the state under present-day conditions has immeasurably grown. At present, air defense has assumed strategic significance. The Air Defense Troops at present are troops on constant combat alert. In accord with the Law "Governing the USSR State Frontier" in peacetime they are on the forward edge of the defenses of the motherland's sacred frontiers and they have been entrusted with the carrying out of a mission of state importance, that is, to stand alert duty. The organization and weaponry as well as all the combat activities of the troops are subordinate to carrying out this main mission. Due to the efforts of our scientists and engineers as well as to the unstinting labor of the workers, the subunits and units of the Air Defense Troops have weapons which can hit any possible targets.

The men of the 1980's, the worthy successors of the military valor of their fathers and grandfathers, are hard at work mastering these mighty weapons. The enormous combat experience of the Great Patriotic War is gaining broad creative application in intense combat training.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirivoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 21.
2. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1978, p 583.
3. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 7, 1976, pp 138-139.

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CSO: 1801/304

## TRAINING OF MILITARY PERSONNEL DURING YEARS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 59-63

[Article by Col Gen V. A. Goncharov, first deputy chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense]

[Text] Under the conditions of the growing military threat from Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan, the Communist Party and the Soviet government initiated a series of important measures aimed at strengthening the nation's defense capability and raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. At the same time, more than 200,000 men of command and supervisory personnel were called up from the reserves and trained. The number of students in the military academies rose significantly. New military schools were established. By June 1941, the command, political and engineer-technical personnel was being trained in 19 military academies, at 10 military faculties under civilian VUZes, in 7 higher naval schools and in 203 middle-level military schools.

The surprise attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR created very difficult conditions for mobilization. The situation developing on the front and the losses of our troops demanded an immediate intensification of work to provide officer personnel for the operational army. This was due to the fact that just during the first 8 days of the war, some 5.3 million men were mobilized into the Armed Forces. The immediate work of providing the troops with officer personnel was carried out by the personnel bodies from the central directorates of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] as well as by the military commissariats.

At the start of the war, a particularly acute need arose for higher command personnel. Bold promotion was the solely correct solution to the problem of filling leadership positions. Promoted to positions of regimental commanders were basically commanders from the battalions of military school officer candidates, the deputy commanders and chiefs of staff of rifle regiments as well as instructors from military schools. Subsequently, leading positions were filled chiefly by command personnel who had gained combat experience on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Other sources for recruiting command personnel were: command personnel released from rear units and facilities as well as those returning upon

recovery from hospitals; reserve officers considered fit for service in the army after medical recertification and recalled for wartime; persons from the quartermaster and administrative services who had undergone retraining; command personnel shifted to the operational army from other people's commissariats, for example, from the people's commissariats of the Navy, internal affairs and so forth; privates and sergeants promoted to command positions and political work for distinction in battle.

Upon a decision of the obkoms, kraykoms and the central committees of the Union republic communist parties, from 22 June 1941 through 20 May 1942, some 132,356 political workers were mobilized. Over the 11 months of the war from them around 3,000 persons were promoted to political work and around 4,500 persons to command positions.

As is known, a significant number of leading party cadres was sent into the Army and Navy including 270 highly placed workers from the apparatus of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and 500 secretaries from the central committees of the Union republic communist parties and the kraykoms, obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms.

Regardless of the measures adopted, the operational army continued to feel a shortage of trained personnel, particularly command personnel for the mortar units, the corps and antiaircraft artillery and signals units.

For providing command personnel for the new formations, during the very first days of the war there was an early graduation of students from the senior courses of the command faculties and partially the engineer faculties of the military academies and officer candidates from the military schools. At the end of June and in July 1941 alone, around 107,000 persons were graduated early, including 5,319 men from the main faculties of the military academies and more than 101,500 men from the military schools.

In order to satisfy the ever-increasing demand of the fronts for command personnel, it was essential to convert following a plan worked out in peacetime to shortened training courses in the military schools, to significantly increase the TOE number of rotating personnel and establish new military schools. Under the academies they continued operating the academy courses for advanced training of command personnel. The number of trainees at these courses was significantly increased. Thus, the number of rotating personnel for academy courses at the Military Engineer Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev increased by 20-fold in comparison with peacetime.

The central courses for the advanced training of command personnel were converted to training regiment and battalion commanders as well as staff officers for the regimental and divisional level. Troop commanders having combat experience as well as persons called up from the reserves were sent to the advanced training courses and training regiments for improving their theoretical knowledge as well as for retraining in other specialties.

The training periods at the courses for advanced training of command personnel were set as follows: 4-6 months for infantry; 2-6 months for cavalry; 3-12 months for signals; 3-6 months for engineer; 10 months for topographic, 3

months for VOSO [military transport]; 2-4 months for quartermaster; 2-9 months for medical; 6 months for veterinary. In the artillery training regiments the period of instruction was set as an average of 4 months.

The network of military schools for training platoon commanders was particularly enlarged. The number of military schools for the Ground Forces was increased by more than 20 percent and the TOE number of officer candidates by 67 percent. The increase in both instances fell almost completely on the infantry, artillery, armored and cavalry schools.

In line with the reorganization during the first months of the war of many pilots schools and basic training schools, the number of military schools of the Air Forces declined by 29 percent, but on the other hand the total TOE number of officer candidates in the Air Forces military schools increased by 11 percent. The number of naval schools and their TOE remained virtually unchanged.

Thus, after the mobilizing of the army, the total establishment number of officer candidates in the military schools of the Soviet Armed Forces by the end of 1941 had increased by 38 percent. The training periods had been shortened in the military schools.

In the course of the war against the Nazi invaders, the Soviet Army constantly improved its combat skills. The military schools were to carefully watch this and quickly utilize the war's experience in the combat training of the officer candidates and students.

The Armed Forces military schools, as a result of great and intense work during the Great Patriotic War, prepared and graduated more than 880,000 officers. In addition, more than 355,000 young commanders were trained by the junior lieutenant courses.

The courses for the advanced training of command and supervisory personnel, the higher schools and the training regiments during the years of the Patriotic War retrained more than 332,000 commanders. The Vystrel [Shot] higher rifle-tactical advanced training courses alone retrained around 18,000 commanders, including 100 deputy commanders and chiefs of staffs of formations, 3,000 regimental commanders, their deputies and regimental chiefs of staff.

By the war's end, the Armed Forces had 45 military-political schools. In addition, under the front junior lieutenants courses there were departments for training regimental party and Komsomol organizers. In 1944, under the Academy imeni V. I. Lenin a higher correspondence military-political school was organized.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the situation required the establishing of a permanent reserve of officer personnel. In July 1941, on the Western Front at Smolensk, the first officer personnel reserve was organized. Subsequently, this was also done on other fronts. A reserve of senior officer personnel, from a deputy regimental commander, the commander of a separate battalion and higher, from major to general, inclusively, was

always maintained and available directly under the personnel section of a front.

The army reserve of officer personnel was established initially as a separate battalion comprising an army reserve regiment but subsequently this entire regiment became a reserve of officer personnel.

It must be said that the military schools during the war operated under difficult and in a number of instances very severe conditions. In 1941-1942, when combat came close to the basic locations of the military schools, a predominant majority of the military academies, schools and advanced training courses for officer personnel was evacuated into the interior of the nation.

A whole range of measures had to be carried out which would help to improve the quality of the permanent officer personnel of the military schools and ensure its stability. For this purpose, as of 1943, it was prohibited to send permanent officer personnel on mission from the military schools. Along with this measures were taken to fill the military schools with lacking officer personnel, chiefly by veterans who had been discharged from hospitals as well as by special selection in the units of the operational army. In 1943-1944, the officer personnel of the military schools was reviewed in the aim of its qualitative improvement. A large group of officers received governmental decorations for work in military schools.

In the aim of the more profound introduction of wartime experience into the combat training of the officer candidates and students, one other measure had to be carried out, that is, the sending of officers from the permanent personnel of military schools for tours of duty in the troops of the fronts.

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the quality of training for this personnel had been significantly improved even in comparison with the prewar period. In comparison with 1936, the number of party members and candidate members among them had increased by 11 percent, persons with a higher military education by 18 percent and with a higher and general secondary education by 22.3 percent.

Over the period from October 1942 through April 1943, the NKV appointed around 3,000 political workers to command positions. Thousands of political workers were sent to command courses. Their appointment to command positions was particularly widely practiced after corresponding training at the courses, in schools and academies from the end of May through September 1943. The number was over 130,000 persons. As a total over the period of the Great Patriotic War more than 140,000 political workers were transferred to command positions.

The military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and the party organizations of the operational army constantly carried out great work in the training and indoctrination of the personnel. The rights of the command levels were broadened to appoint officers to positions, to award military ranks and present orders and medals on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. By the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 10 November 1942, the right of awarding orders and medals of the USSR to commanders and soldiers who had distinguished themselves on the front in the

struggle against the Nazi invaders was granted to the commanders of fronts, fleets, armies and flotillas, corps, divisions, brigades and regiments.

By the decrees of the State Defense Committee [GKO] of 20 November 1941, 16 January and 17 February 1942, shortened periods for acquiring military ranks were established for persons of command and supervisory personnel in the operational army and navy. This contributed significantly to their more rapid service promotion and ensured the prompt awarding of military ranks to the worthy defenders of the Soviet motherland.

Soviet women played an important role in ensuring victory. More than 80,000 women officers served on the front and 86 women received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The partisan movement provided powerful support for the Soviet Army and this assumed a nationwide and organized character. Over 10,000 officers fought in the partisan units and formations and they, as a rule, held positions of the chiefs of staff and deputy commanders of detachments and formations.

Thus, due to the constant concern of the Communist Party the problem of training highly skilled officer personnel for the Army and Navy was successfully carried out and this was one of the important factors in the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. We completed the Patriotic War not only without having a great shortage of officer personnel but also maintaining a large reserve of officer personnel of all levels, starting from the platoon commander and ending with the generals of the Soviet Army.

For courage and heroism and for skillful troop leadership virtually all the officer personnel received combat orders and medals, around 7,500 officers, generals, admirals and marshals of the Soviet Union received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 100 persons became Heroes twice while G. K. Zhukov, I. N. Kozhedub and A. I. Pokryshkin received this award thrice. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union, junior officers comprised 47.8 percent, senior officers were 13.8 percent and higher officers 2.3 percent.

The Communist Party, in organizing and directing the work of the training, political and military indoctrination, recruitment and placement of officer personnel, at present proceed from a thorough consideration of the experience during the years of the Great Patriotic War as well as the nature and particular features of modern wars and the development of military affairs. In following the admonishment of V. I. Lenin of never forgetting the danger threatening us and always being on guard, the Communist Party and the Soviet government constantly focus on the questions of improving the training of military personnel and work with them as one of the chief conditions ensuring higher combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

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## ESTABLISHMENT, USE OF STRATEGIC RESERVES IN WAR YEARS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 63-67

[Article by Col Gen V. N. Karpov, chief of the Strategy Chair of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent]

[Text] The history of wars and particularly the Great Patriotic War convincingly shows that success in armed combat to a significant degree depends upon the presence and skillful employment of strategic reserves.

During the prewar years, in assessing the military-political situation and the possibility of an attack on our country, the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the Soviet government, in following the instructions of V. I. Lenin that "victory in a war will be on the side which has more reserves, more sources of strength, more endurance among the masses of people,"<sup>(1)</sup> carried out great work to establish reserves. The basis for the successful resolution of this problem was the development of the socialist economy and the increased production of military products, particularly new types of weapons and combat equipment. An important measure in developing the strategic reserves was the broadening of the training of military personnel and the accumulation of mobilization reserves of personnel.

In carrying out the measures outlined by the party to increase the nation's defense capability, the People's Commissariat of Defense [NKO] and the General Staff on the war's eve, drew particular attention to the questions of strengthening the border military districts and establishing a second echelon of a strategic grouping of Soviet Armed Forces in the West. For this purpose at the end of April 1941, the Transbaykal and Far Eastern Military Districts were ordered to send to the west one mechanized corps and two rifle corps. In mid-May 1941, the 19th, 21st and 22d Armies from the Northern Caucasus, Volga and Urals Military Districts as well as the XXV Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District received orders to begin moving up to a line of the Western Dvina, Dnieper. All these troops were to be deployed on the lines provided for them and together with other formations comprise the reserve of the High Command. However, the commenced war substantially altered the plans.

The fierce military operations over the enormous front required new major

reserves which were also diversified in terms of composition and purpose. For systematizing and centralizing the work involved in establishing these, on 16 July the GKO [State Defense Committee] adopted the decision "on preparing reserves in the system of the NKO and Navy." The leadership of this work was assigned to a special group set up under the NKO. At the end of July, it was transformed into the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Soviet Army Troops. All possible measures were taken to develop the defense industry and to work out the production methods and introduce into mass production new types of military products. These made it possible to resolve the difficult problem of creating strategic reserves. Even by December 1941, 291 divisions and 94 brigades had been organized(2) and this substantially was reflected in the further course of events as it made it possible to halt the enemy advance. The commitment of fresh strategic reserves and the massing of them on the most important sectors ensured the success of going over to a counteroffensive on the main axis, at Moscow, and the development of this into a general offensive.

During the spring of 1942, there were indications of a strategic lull. The Soviet Command used this for fielding the strategic reserves. On 1 April 1942, these included the 2 headquarters of all-arms armies, 27 divisions, 6 brigades, 1 fortified area and 37 air regiments.(3)

In preparing for active operations with decisive aims, at the start of 1943, Headquarters simultaneously with strengthening the operational fronts, established large strategic reserves. By the summer of 1943, the reserves had 3 all-arms armies, 2 tank armies and 1 air army number over a million men, 16,782 guns and mortars, 2,688 tanks and 662 combat aircraft. Artillery, antiaircraft artillery and guards mortar [rocket launcher] brigades, divisions and artillery breakthrough corps were established.(4)

In the course of subsequent military operations, the strategic reserves were constantly replenished and as more modern weapons were developed, the quality was substantially improved and the combat capabilities of the reserve field forces, formations and units increased.

It must be pointed out that Hq SHC constantly exercised leadership over the creation and accumulation of strategic reserves. Although in the course of the 1943 operations a significant portion of these was used, by the start of the winter campaign Headquarters had in its reserves three all-arms armies and two tank armies, the headquarters of two all-arms armies and an air army, six tank corps, a mechanized corps, an airborne corps and a mixed air corps.(5)

The presence of major reserves made it possible at the beginning of 1944 to conduct offensive operations at Leningrad and on the central and southern sectors of the Soviet-German Front and in the summer on the southwestern, western and northwestern sectors. The shifting of effort from one sector to another required large-scale regroupings of men and weapons. In the course of the campaign the fronts received 80 rifle divisions, 9 tank and mechanized corps and 2 cavalry corps.(6)

The presence of large strategic reserves provided an opportunity for Headquarters to establish groupings of armed forces which conformed to the

overall plan of the operations and to promptly influence changes in the situation in the course of the offensive operations. At the same time, the SHC endeavored to keep strategic reserves for the concluding period of the Great Patriotic War. By the start of 1945, in the reserve of Hq SHC there were the headquarters of 2 fronts, 4 all-arms armies and 2 air armies, 4 tank and mechanized corps, 20 rifle divisions as well as other formations and units. These numbered 501,100 men, 6,883 guns and mortars, 520 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount] and 464 combat aircraft.(7)

Simultaneously with the conclusion of the war in the West, the Soviet Union, loyal to its Allied obligations, was readying men and weapons to defeat imperialist Japan. For this purpose, the troops of certain fronts which had completed military operations on the Soviet-German Front were employed. As a total 2 front headquarters and 4 army headquarters, 15 corps headquarters, 36 divisions and 53 brigades of the main branches of ground forces were regrouped to the Far East. In addition, the headquarters of an air corps and 5 air divisions were shifted.(8)

Thus, in the course of the Great Patriotic War great attention was given to the questions of establishing and replenishing the strategic reserves by the Supreme High Command.

As for the **structure of the strategic reserves**, in all stages of the war this was marked by great diversity. At the very outset of the war, when the enemy as a whole surpassed our army in men and weapons, an absolute majority in the overall structure of the reserves was comprised of Ground Forces formations, primarily all-arms formations as well as different types of engineer troops so essential on the defensive. Considering the advantage of the enemy in tanks and aviation, Headquarters undertook active measures to establish antitank and antiaircraft artillery regiments, and from August 1941, also reserve air groups. Guards mortar [rocket launcher] units and tank brigades were rapidly organized. Subsequently, in keeping with the increased capabilities of the defense industry, in the interests of successfully overcoming the positional enemy defenses, separate tank brigades and regiments began to be organized for operations as close support tanks, and for developing the offensive in April-July 1942, tank and mechanized corps and tank armies. At the same time, instead of reserve air groups they began organizing reserve air armies and later air corps.

Depending upon the available resources and the situational conditions, the **establishing and replacement of strategic reserves** in the course of the war were carried out by two methods: up to mid-1942, predominantly by new formations; subsequently chiefly by withdrawing field forces, formations and units from the operational fronts for manning up with personnel, combat equipment and training.

The most important **principle in the employment** of the reserves was their centralized and massed employment. Here the main reserves of Headquarters were employed, as a rule, on the major strategic sectors. Thus, during the fierce engagements during the summer and autumn of 1941, on the main Western sector out of the total number of the rifle divisions of the Reserve of Hq SHC

[RVGK] (291) some 150 had been assigned (52 percent) as well as a predominant amount of the artillery regiments, the tank and engineer units of the RVGK.(9)

Equally effective was the use of the RVGK in the course of the defensive operation and in going over to the counteroffensive by the Soviet troops at Stalingrad ending in the encirclement and destruction of a major Nazi troop grouping as well as in the subsequent offensive operations in the winter of 1942-1943.

The SHC employed the reserves with particular skill in the Kursk Battle. Here the noteworthy feature is that on the sector where the enemy main thrust was expected, in the rear of the first echelon fronts, the Steppe Front was deployed representing the strongest field force of strategic reserves ever established in the course of the war. It included seven armies (five all-arms, one tank and one air, one rifle corps, six tank and mechanized corps and three cavalry corps).(10)

Hq SHC also showed great art in the use of strategic reserves in preparing and conducting ten successive attacks in 1944. It successfully solved the problem of concealing their concentration and surprise employment on various axes. Reserves played a particularly important role in the Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other strategic operations of 1945.

Strategic reserves were employed for carrying out diverse missions. In defensive operations they were employed primarily to restore a disrupted strategic front. One of their missions was to establish the strategic depth of defense on the main sector and form a new front in depth. Such a mission, in particular, was given to the troops of the Reserve Front in July-September 1941 on the Moscow sector and subsequently two armies at Voronezh, three armies on the Stalingrad sector and the Steppe Front in the Kursk Battle. The major mission of the strategic reserves was also to launch strong counterstrikes and employ them for going over to a counteroffensive.

In offensive operations, the strategic reserves were used chiefly for establishing attack groupings and reinforce the fronts in the course of an offensive. Thus, in preparing for the 1944 summer and autumn operations, eight all-arms armies, two tank armies and two air armies as a total were turned over to the operational fronts for establishing offensive groupings.

One of the central missions for the strategic reserves was to develop the offensive in depth, to increase the strength of the attack by the fronts, to thwart the enemy plans to destabilize the situation and to repel enemy counterstrikes and a counteroffensive. An important role was played by the tank armies, the tank, mechanized and cavalry corps assigned from the RVGK to form the mobile groups of the fronts and armies.

Also worthy of attention is the **experience of leadership** over the establishing and employment of strategic reserves as gained during the years of the Great Patriotic War. This leadership was exercised by Hq SHC and the General Staff. Precisely they in all instances solved the most fundamental questions concerning the strength and structure of the strategic reserves, the procedure for establishing, determining the goals and tasks of their employment,

shifting from one sector to another, transfer to the operational fronts and withdrawal to the disposition of Headquarters. The following data eloquently show the enormous work of Headquarters and the General Staff in establishing reserves. In the Ground Forces alone over the first period of the war (22 June--18 November 1942), 30 army headquarters were organized along with over 1,200 rifle, tank, mechanized and artillery formations and units, including 367 rifle divisions.(11)

The skillful accumulation, training and effective employment of strategic reserves are among the most important accomplishments of Soviet military art in the Great Patriotic War. The experience of establishing and employing strategic reserves has not only not lost its importance but has assumed even greater urgency and significance.

The necessity of reserves stems from the very essence and destructive nature of modern wars. The mass employment of more effective weapons leads to significant troops losses, to the formation of breaches in their formation, to a sharp disrupting of the balance of forces on the major sectors, to rapid changes in the situation and to the development of crisis situations on a front; for this significant additional resources must be drawn upon and various sorts of reserves committed to action.

The appearance and rapid development of new conventional weapons which possess great range, high precision and increased power raise difficult questions of concealing the deployment of strategic reserves, organizing their dependable defense as well as skillful moving up and employment in operations. All of this necessitates a profound scientific approach to solving the question of establishing and employing strategic reserves under present-day conditions.

#### FOOTNOTES

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3. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 5, 1975, p 2.
4. Ibid., Vol 7, 1976, pp 100, 101, 109, 119.
5. Ibid., Vol 8, 1988, p 46.
6. Ibid., p 483.
7. Ibid., Vol 10, 1979, p 37.
8. Ibid., Vol 11, p 193.
9. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1972, p 48.

10. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna...", p 215.

11. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945 gg. Entsiklopediya" [The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. An Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1985, p 689.

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CSO: 1801/304

## USING EXPERIENCE OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR IN TRAINING WARSAW PACT JOINT FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 68-71

[Article by Lt Gen Yu. A. Khvorostyanov, deputy chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact]

[Text] On 14 May, the Soviet people, the men of the Armed Forces, the peoples and armies of the fraternal socialist countries and all progressive mankind solemnly celebrated the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. Very symbolically this jubilee has been celebrated almost simultaneously with the 40th anniversary of the historic victory over Naziism in World War II. There is an unbreakable link between these events which have had and continue to have a major impact upon the development of international relations and the entire history of mankind. The glorious revolutionary traditions of the joint defense of socialism have undergone severe testing and become stronger precisely in the struggle against the common enemy, and the bases were established for a defensive alliance of the peoples and armies of the European socialist countries.

The collective actions of the allied armies of the Central and Southeastern European countries during the years of World War II accelerated the carrying out of the main strategic task of all the anti-Nazi forces, that is, the military defeat of Nazi Germany and its satellites. They contributed a great deal that was new to the military art of the future socialist armies and established strong bases for the unity of the fraternal peoples and armies.

The armed forces of the fraternal countries during the last war gained great experience in the joint execution of offensive and defensive operations. In the course of joint combat the system of unified command was actually tested out. For ensuring command of coalition troops it was a practice of establishing operational groups under the staffs of the fronts and the staffs of the Allied armies. In the Allied corps and divisions, by agreement with the corresponding governments, there were advisors from the USSR Armed Forces. In joint combat by the Allied armies there was further development of the forms of political cooperation, international indoctrination, and the strengthening of friendship between the armies and peoples of the states which, after the victorious conclusion of the war, set out on the path of socialist construction.

Under present-day conditions the effective preparation of the Joint Warsaw Pact Armed Forces to repel possible aggression can be carried out only considering the experience of the previous wars and with its creative assimilation in terms of the new, altered conditions on a basis of a modern material and technical base. Of particular value is the experience gained by the Soviet Army during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It contributed largely to instituting a unity of views concerning the forms and methods of combat and to establishing a definite identicalness in the organization and establishment of the troops, weapons and combat equipment of the Warsaw Pact armies. This has created objective prerequisites for the Joint Armed Forces to successfully carry out the tasks confronting them.

The study and use of combat experience in the Allied armies started in the course of the Great Patriotic War. This was aided by the fact that many field forces, formations and units of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Romanian troops were organized and prepared for combat on Soviet territory in accord with the regulations and manuals of the Soviet Army and they were armed and outfitted with the best Soviet weapons and combat equipment of those times.

We must also point out the positive role of Soviet experience in organizing the training process in the military schools and courses and the use of highly skilled Soviet instructor personnel in training the command personnel of the friendly armies. Thus, virtually all the command and political personnel of the 1st and 2d Romanian Volunteer Infantry Divisions underwent training and retraining in Soviet military schools and at different courses.(1)

The victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War and the formation of the world socialist system contributed to the genesis of military scientific principles in the socialist states. Here the communist parties of the fraternal countries during the first postwar years set out to make the greatest possible use of CPSU experience in military organizational development and to study Soviet military art and military science the successes of which were obvious. This was also caused by the presence in a majority of the fraternal armies of Soviet weapons, by the necessity of quickly increasing the combat might of the armed forces for repelling possible imperialist aggression and finally, by the converting to troop instruction for combat under the conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons.

During the development period of the fraternal socialist armies, the mastery of Soviet military art occurred in several areas. One of them was the elaboration of manuals and regulations following the Soviet model but considering the specific conditions of the country. For example, in 1948, the Soviet Union turned over to Bulgaria more than 100 titles of requested literature. Also granted was the request of the Romanian Army to receive Soviet Army manuals and regulations on the basis of which the Romanian manuals were revised.

In the study and use of the war's experience a positive role was played by the Soviet officers who taught in the military academies and schools of the fraternal countries. Thus, in December 1945, Soviet instructors were in five newly organized military schools of the Czechoslovak People's Army.



Subsequently, with the opening of new schools in the socialist commonwealth countries, the number of Soviet instructors constantly increased. At the request of the governments of the fraternal countries many servicemen were accepted for instruction in the Soviet military academies and schools.

Thus, an important prerequisite for true unity was the common views established in the fraternal countries concerning the questions of military organizational development and the use of the experience of the Soviet Armed Forces and actual troop training and political training for the personnel. The realization of these views provided a dependable basis for establishing a firm alliance of the states aimed at the defense of peace and socialism.

With the formation of the defensive Warsaw Pact, Marxist-Leninist military science which incorporated the very rich experience of the Great Patriotic War was significantly strengthened and underwent further development. At present, it has become a truly international science and a major factor in increasing the combat readiness and capability of the fraternal armies and strengthening the military might of the commonwealth of socialist states. In past years a unity of views has been worked out on the nature of possible wars and the methods of conducting them and this has made it possible to effectively carry out military organizational development as well as the instruction and indoctrination of the armed forces personnel.

The experience of the development of military theoretical thought in the Warsaw Pact armies has confirmed that international collaboration in the area of military science allows the more rational use of material and intellectual potentials of the country with the least outlays and ensures the more rapid attaining of the set goals. As a result of collaboration in the area of military science, the fraternal armies have adopted common major standards as well as regulations, manuals and instructions which coincide in their major provisions. General principles for the training of troops and staffs have been worked out and put into practice.

The solving of problems in the area of coordinating efforts in military science as well as generalizing and employing the war's experience has been largely aided by the founding within the Joint Warsaw Pact Armed Forces of bodies which are involved in the organization and planning of scientific research.

An analysis of the work done by the Staff and other headquarters bodies of the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces makes it possible to isolate the following basic forms for studying, generalizing and employing combat experience: training exercises and drills (maneuvers); the analysis of operations (battles) conducted during the years of the Great Patriotic War; an independent study of the wartime experience by officers; generalization and use by them of this experience in carrying out scientific work; military scientific (military history) conferences.

One of the most effective and widespread forms of assimilating and using combat experience in the training practices of the Joint Armed Forces is the joint exercises (maneuvers) conducted annually since 1961. In the course of them, along with working out new concepts of modern operational art and

tactics, the instructive experience of the preparation and conduct of operations (battles) during the years of the Great Patriotic War is also widely employed. This involves the organizing of cooperation and all-round support, the achieving of concealment and surprise of actions, ensuring a high rate of advance and continuous troop actions and so forth. This experience has been successfully employed in conducting many exercises. In working out an overall concept and plan for the exercise, the literature is thoroughly studied which analyzes the experience of the preparation and conduct of combat in the given area during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

In the practice of combat and operational training for the troops and staffs, extensive use is made of the experience gained in the war years of commanding coalition field forces and formations. Under present-day conditions there has been significant dissemination and development of reciprocal exchanges of staff members among the allied troops and in particular the exchange of operations groups (liaison officers) on different levels. The study and assimilation of combat experience to a certain degree have contributed to the elaboration and introduction of a number of documents on troop command.

Also studied and employed in practice is the experience of logistic support by the rear bodies of the Soviet Army for the foreign formations fighting against the common enemy, the use of various types of transport on the territory of the allied states, the providing of aid to the population and a number of other questions of rear and special technical support.

In the system of commander training very beneficial has been the use in lectures on modern military art of examples from the war's experience as this gives them great substantiation and persuasiveness and evokes in the officers a greater interest in the studied problem.

The mastery of the principles of military science and military art by the military personnel of the Joint Armed Forces and the establishing of national military scientific personnel have helped to broaden scientific research on studying and generalizing combat experience in the national armed forces. In the 1950's and 1960's, the fraternal armies have established centers (institutes) for studying military history, they are beginning to publish military history journals and military theoretical works are appearing as well as military scientific research devoted to studying the processes of military art and to generalizing advanced experience in the conduct of combat by the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War. In the military history research in the fraternal armies, particularly in the last decade, an important place has been held by the questions of the involvement of the armies and patriotic forces of the allied countries in the armed struggle against Nazism as well as the history of establishing and developing the national armed forces.

The generalization and use of combat experience are of great importance in the carrying out of scientific works by the officers of the Joint Armed Forces and the forms of these works are most diverse. These include scientific papers, abstracts, reports, the preparation of articles for military journals and a number of others.

Of important indoctrinational and cognitive significance is the showing of documentary, training and artistic films on military subjects reflecting the questions of military history. These provide a visual image of combat and make it possible to visibly recreate the situation, to show the content and work methods of the command and staffs in the course of an operation (combat) as well as show phenomena and processes in motion and development.

Finally, under present-day conditions of enormous importance is the broad involvement of veterans of the war and Resistance in carrying out tasks of military patriotic indoctrination of the personnel of the Joint Armed Forces and the propagandizing of combat experience.

In following the demands of modern military art, the command personnel of the Joint Armed Forces take into account the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War and particularly one of its most important lessons, to prepare the troops and naval forces in peacetime for what is required in a war. Here they do not mechanically adopt previous experience but rather employ it creatively, considering the possible present and future means and methods of armed combat. This helps to further strengthen combat might and raise the combat readiness of the Joint Armed Forces, an important factor for peace and a dependable shield of the socialist commonwealth.

[From the Editors] In the concluding stage of the section's work giving a brief statement was Col Gen (Ret) I. S. Glebov. He took up the question of organizing troop command in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War and pointed out a number of shortcomings which occurred in this area of activity.

#### FOOTNOTE

1. See: "Zarozhdeniye narodnykh armiy stran--uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora" [The Birth of the People's Armies of the Warsaw Pact Members], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1975, p 209.

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**FLT ADM SU GORSHKOV ON NAVY ACHIEVEMENTS, TASKS**

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 24 Jun 85) pp 72-80

[Interview given by Flt Adm SU Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy, deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Defense, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, to Capt 1st Class V. G. Oppokov, editor of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, entitled: "Raising Combat Readiness and Vigilance, Skillfully Utilizing Accumulated Experience"]

[Text] The navymen and all Soviet people are observing Navy Day in the conditions of high political and labor enthusiasm inspired by the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the great victory and the preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress. In this connection, the editors of this journal asked Flt Adm SU Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy, deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Defense, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, to answer a few questions. The following is a record of the interview of the prominent Soviet naval leader by Capt 1st Class V. G. Oppokov, editor of the journal.

[Question] Comrade Flt Adm SU, what achievements have the navymen prepared for their, or more correctly, the all-national festive day this year?

[Answer] Navy Day has really become an all-national festive day. The Soviet people show sincere respect for the navymen, take pride in their deeds, and rely on them. This general attention places great responsibility on the fleet. And the navymen strive to justify the trust of the party and people.

This year, which is marked by such significant events as the 115th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, the command and all other personnel of the naval fleet have directed their efforts toward raising their combat readiness and vigilance as well as their political and technical knowledge to higher levels. The process of combat training continues to be perfected. The further aggravation of the situation in the ocean and sea naval theaters has substantially influenced this training. Imperialist countries have significantly intensified the activities of their naval forces. The U.S. naval forces have noticeably increased the intensity and scale of their exercises. These exercises have

been clearly marked by a pronounced anti-Soviet direction and by coordination in all strategic ocean areas. Combat training has been carried out by our fleets after taking this situation into account.

A great deal of attention has been devoted to operational and tactical training. As a result, the commanding officers, commanders, and staff officers have broadened their operational-tactical horizons and increased their skills in planning modern naval combat operations. The use of active types of training, which enable admirals and officers to more effectively control the forces of different arms and organize their interaction, has contributed to this.

The analysis of results of the winter combat training shows that, in most cases, it was conducted in an organized manner; purposefully, rhythmically, and more effectively than in the preceding year. In the past half-year, many ship crews have passed through one of the schools of vigilance, sea training and physical endurance by spending time in long ocean voyages and successfully fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them. Rapid changes in conditions and various surprise situations represent an objective law-governed element in combat conditions. Therefore, great attention was devoted to sudden opening of fire, opening fire in the shortest possible time and under night conditions. Simultaneous comprehensive use of several types of weapons was perfected. The interaction of all-arms forces in sea combat was accurately worked out.

Now, at the height of summer training, the navymen are persistently perfecting their professional skills, raising their class standing, and strengthening the prescribed order aboard ships and in shore subunits. Raising combat readiness to higher levels is impossible without firm discipline that is based on the ideological conviction of personnel and the spiritual maturity of the collective. For this reason the commanding staff, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations devote the greatest attention in their everyday work to the ideological-political and military education and to instilling in military personnel the sense of responsibility for the country's security and for defense of peace and socialism.

The socialist competition that was developed in the army and the fleet under the slogan "Our selfless military work to the 40th anniversary of the great victory and the 27th CPSU Congress!" provided a powerful stimulus to the perfecting of combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline and prescribed order and represented an inseparable part of the training and education process. The crew of the missile cruiser Slava, initiator of socialist competition in the Navy, is in the front ranks of competitors. This crew continues in a worthy manner the combat traditions of the crews of the Russian and Soviet ships that at one time or another sailed under that glorious name. The cruiser's seamen persistently master weapons and combat equipment, skillfully operate mechanisms and instruments, and learn to hit the "enemy" quickly and accurately in difficult and frequently changing situations, in any weather or navigational conditions. The front-rank crew completed a long ocean voyage and carried out missile launchings and artillery fire with high performance indicators. It fulfilled all of its obligations and norms. It was proclaimed an excellent crew on the basis of its

performance last year and it is now confirming this high title in honor of Navy Day. The missile cruiser Slava is followed in this respect by the nuclear cruiser Kirov, the missile cruiser Groznyy, and the anti-submarine cruiser Novorossiysk. Many other ship's crews and air and shore units are also successfully fulfilling their assumed obligations. Inspired by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum, they strive to hit their training targets with the first missile, first torpedo, first bomb, first shell. Briefly, they strive to fully utilize all the potential of the modern technical equipment and weapons with which the fleet is being supplied, thanks to the care of the party and government.

[Question] Recently it has become usual to hear or read that the scientific-technical revolution has fundamentally changed the appearance of our Armed Forces. What is the essence of the changes that have taken place particularly in the naval fleet? What is the difference between the fleet of yesterday and the fleet of today?

[Answer] To give a complete answer to this question it is necessary to make a little excursion into the recent past, that is, using your words, to those yesterdays.

As is known, the Armed Forces and all Soviet people triumphantly concluded the Great Patriotic War and thereby made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. Our fleet, too, emerged with honor from the severe test. It enriched itself with valuable combat experience in the struggle against a powerful enemy at sea.

In the postwar years, beginning approximately in the fifties, there was intensive work to build an ocean fleet. It is necessary to stress in this connection that this work started as a countermeasure, as a measure that was forced upon us by the aggravated international situation. It is incumbent upon this ocean fleet to fulfill the important task of protecting the fatherland's ocean frontiers, not only along the coasts but also in distant regions of seas and oceans, as well as to make the same problems for our adversaries as they try to create for us in ocean areas. True, our measures are countermeasures and their main purpose is to deter; that is, the enemies of peace must constantly feel and know that in the event that they carry out a nuclear missile strike from any of the sea or ocean areas, a retaliatory strike against their territory will immediately follow as a retribution for the aggressive attack. The development and qualitative transformation of the fleet were carried out simultaneously in several areas. The main areas were: the construction of nuclear-powered submarine fleet; the formation of naval strategic and operational nuclear missile systems and a long-range air force, that is, an ocean air force; the equipping of ships with aviation means; and a qualitative change of ship radioelectronic equipment. The automation of the control of forces, weapons, and combat equipment was developed on the basis of a wide utilization of the potential of radioelectronics. Our fleet began to meet the present-day requirements. It is possible to correctly claim that in the sphere of its development no area has been overlooked by fundamental and principled changes under the impact of scientific-technical progress in the postwar period. The fleet now has ships of different classes and it has its nuclear-powered missile submarines as its main strike force that really

determines the necessary level of our state's naval power. It is no exaggeration to say that the present state of the fleet has consolidated the Soviet Union's position as a great sea power. It has widened the potential of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces and invested it with new qualities that fully correspond to the tasks of strengthening the defense of the countries of the socialist community.

In the 40 years since the war, the naval fleet has been transformed into a reliable shield of the country through the will of the party and people. A component part of the Armed Forces, it is capable, both together with other services of the Armed Forces and independently, of fulfilling its strategic and operational tasks in the theaters of naval operations. The contemporary fleet is able to strike important ground targets of the enemy; destroy enemy forces at sea and in bases; support the ground forces with nuclear missile strikes and assault landings from the sea; repel enemy assault landings from the sea; disrupt the enemy's naval communications, and protect its own communications. A great strike power, high maneuverability of groups of ships and aircraft, enormous range of operations, capability to quickly and secretly deploy forces and carry out crushing strikes against ground and sea targets, constant combat readiness of units and formations, and high professional and unwavering ideological staunchness of its personnel are the main characteristics of the fleet.

[Question] What is your attitude toward the widespread opinion that the ship's commander is the main figure of the fleet? Does this opinion correspond to reality? If it does, what qualities must a modern ship's commander possess to be able to fulfill this role?

[Answer] I think that there is no exaggeration in this opinion. The ship is the basic unit of the fleet, which is intended for decisive and active operations and for fulfilling the most complex and responsible tasks.

The ship's commander occupies a corresponding position in the fleet. And now about the qualities he must possess: New times naturally also dictate new and higher demands. These demands do not concern only the means of armed struggle at sea but also its main participants, the soldiers, and, first and foremost, the commanders. If we say that the scientific-technical revolution has fundamentally changed the equipment of the navy and the forms of its operational-strategic utilization, then it is also a fact that, in no lesser measure, it has also influenced the training of the fleet's command personnel, the level of its political, professional, and pedagogic knowledge, and its practical experience, horizons, and thinking. The introduction of new types of weapons, technical means, and automated control systems and the development of forms and methods of conducting battles has inevitably also entailed a higher level of training of the commander. It is not enough now for the commander to know only his ship, its weapons and technical equipment, and the methods of their combat utilization. He must possess extensive knowledge in the sphere of operational arts and tactics, have a thorough understanding of the latest achievements in science and technology, and be capable of independently making appropriate decisions. Briefly, the contemporary commander is an officer of the new formation, that is, an intellectually curious man who creatively approaches his tasks, is interested in contacts,

possesses a wide range of scientific-theoretical knowledge, who completely masters naval affairs in detail, and creates methods of training and education of subordinates and develops advanced methods of effective use of the latest military equipment. The role of the ship's commander is even greater during long ocean voyages. The fulfillment of the tasks set for the ship's crew depends to a great extent on his ability to think independently and make correct decisions, on his sense of responsibility and competence, on his will and endurance, and on his authority among personnel. And if his ship makes a friendly visit to a foreign port, then the commander must also be a diplomat.

[Question] Other participants in such a visit certainly must also possess the qualities of diplomats.

[Answer] This is correct. In a situation of this kind, more than at any other time, it is necessary to act with consideration and great responsibility. Ideological staunchness and political vigilance help our people to perform with honor in various complicated situations and their resourcefulness, too, is helpful. I was told about a curious incident. In 1978 a detachment of Soviet warships paid a friendly visit to the Swedish port of Goeteborg. Our seamen gave a concert in an enormous open theater at the central city park. Hundreds of people attended the concert and nearly every number of the concert had to be repeated. After the concert, a correspondent of the local bourgeois newspaper approached the officer who led the ensemble. Approximately the following conversation developed between them. "You Russians certainly know how to intimidate your neighbors. Once you threaten with weapons and then with space flights and now, you see, with musical tricks. Tell me, what was the purpose of gathering such a large concert troop if not to intimidate the Swedes?" "If it seems to you that we wanted to intimidate anyone with our concert program," the officer answered wittily and benevolently, "then consider this as our challenge. We are waiting for a return performance. You can assemble, as you have put it, your musical troop but an even larger one and then 'frighten' us. We will be happy. If we are not forced to take up real weapons, we, the Soviet people, will be pleased to compete with all in every sphere: in scientific discoveries, sports, arts, work...."

He said very correctly: "If we are not forced to take up real weapons." And they are forcing us. Everything that is done in our country to strengthen the might of the Army and the fleet represents countermeasures that have been forced upon us.

Thanks to the constant care of the party and government and their tireless activity in the interests of increasing the combat efficiency of the Armed Forces, the Soviet navymen are mastering everything that is required to reliably safeguard the peaceful work of the people and the inviolability of our maritime borders. In this way they are also making a great contribution to the cause of the struggle for security of all mankind and for continuous peace on earth. To make a point, friendly visits by navymen to various countries help debunk the mendaciousness of the bourgeois propaganda against the USSR and its Armed Forces. The meetings of navymen abroad, their truthful accounts, and their exemplary behavior open the eyes of many people to the Soviet reality.



[Question] Comrade Flt Adm SU, you have spoken about the importance of long ocean voyages for increasing skills, for perfecting seamanship training, and for cohesion of ship crews. However, in addition to that, navymen also carry out extensive scientific research work during their long cruises. What can you say in this connection?

[Answer] Scientific research of seas and oceans has become traditional for the Russian and Soviet fleets. I cite only a few examples in this connection. In 1889, the corvette Vityaz completed its round-the-world voyage that lasted several months. Stephan Osipovich Makarov, commander of the Vityaz and later vice admiral and leader and Hero of Defense of Port Arthur, published a scientific work on the oceanographic research of Russian navymen which earned him worldwide recognition. He commanded the icebreaker Yermak, built according to his designs and under his leadership, on its two Arctic voyages in 1899 and 1901. Many years later, literally following the path of his famous predecessor, Capt 2d Class Lev Mikhaylovich Zhiltsov, subsequently awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, took the nuclear-powered submarine Leninskiy Komsomol to distant northern latitudes. It was under his command that the submarine penetrated the central Arctic between the islands of Victoria and Franz Josef Land. But next time he achieved even more: He twice crossed the North Pole under the Arctic ice. This happened in July 1962. The fact that, in 1966, one of the undersea mountains of the Gakkel Range in the Arctic Ocean was named Leninskiy Komsomol attests to the great public recognition of the services of the crew of the nuclear ship in conquering the depths under the Arctic ice. On 29 September 1963, another Soviet nuclear-powered submarine under the command of Capt 2d Class Yuriy Aleksandrovich Sysoyev, who was also awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, completed its voyage to the North Pole and surfaced precisely at 90-degree geographical latitude.

Next followed the round-the-world group voyage of Soviet submarines which also made it possible to gather valuable scientific materials. A great contribution to science was made by Soviet navymen during the recent round-the-world Antarctic voyage of the navy's oceanographic research ships Adm Vladimirskiy and Faddey Bellingshausen that sailed through 3 oceans and 19 seas and completed a sea voyage of 35,000 miles. The retracing of the route followed by the Minent seafarers, officers and subsequent admirals of the Russian fleet, Faddey Bellingshausen and Milhail Petrovich Lazarev, discoverers of the harsh and mysterious Antarctic, was a remarkable feature of that super-long sea voyage. The main goal of the expedition by the Soviet navymen was to conduct a wide range of hydrographic and oceanographic research work in the little-studied Antarctic.

[Question] In 1980, the collective of authors headed by you was awarded the USSR State Prize for the compilation of the "Atlas of the Oceans." Would you, please, tell us briefly about the efforts connected with this valuable work that has won recognition of the world scientific community. Are other navymen besides you also connected with this work?

[Answer] They are connected most directly.

The "Atlas of the Oceans," published in the 1975-80 period and incorporating a great quantity of unique information on the hydrosphere of the planet, was the crowning achievement of many years of work by a large number of Soviet scientists. Seven million totally new oceanographic observations made with the active participation of navymen during the last 25 or 30 years were collected, systematically arranged, and processed during the work on this atlas. Furthermore, 30,000 ship logbooks were carried out by scientists and specialists of the Navy, the fishing and shipping fleets, and the "scientific squadron" of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The "Atlas of the Oceans" is of great importance for commanders and navigators of warships and serves as a valuable manual for officers in their efforts to master the naval arts.

The research carried out by the fleet, either jointly with other organizations or independently, is not only of an applied but also of fundamental scientific nature.

Today, the study and conquest of the world's oceans are carried out with two diametrically opposed goals. On the one hand is the concern of the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist community, and many developing states about expanding the possibilities for joint exploitation of ocean resources for the benefit of the greater welfare of mankind. On the other hand are the aspirations of the leading capitalist states, headed by the United States, to use oceans in their militarist interests as a sphere of economic expansion and establishment of their domination. Thus, in this difficult situation, we, the Soviet navymen, should not forget the wise Russian's saying: Hope for peace but keep your eyes open.

[Question] Recently the Soviet people and all progressive mankind observed the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany. You were an active participant in the Great Patriotic War. On more than one occasion, the fleet was necessarily engaged in interaction with the ground troops in difficult combat situations. How was this interaction organized? How did the commanders find, so to speak, a common language? In what way can the experience of the war years be useful to a contemporary officer?

[Answer] It is possible to cite many examples of joint combat operations of the ground and naval forces in the Great Patriotic War. I will cite one that is perhaps the most memorable. In August 1942, bitter fighting was in progress around Novorossiysk. The Novorossiysk defense zone was formed to coordinate the operations of the ground, air and naval forces. Maj Gen Andrey Antonovich Grechko assumed the command of the zone at the beginning of September. I was his deputy for naval operations. I say that this was a good school of organization of interaction. A centralized system of controlling the naval bases, battalions, artillery batteries, Air Force Groups and reconnaissance was organized in a difficult and changeable situation.

Having a two-fold superiority over our forces, the enemy was able to overcome a large loop of the main front line. There was a growing danger that the Hitlerites would break through to Tsemesskaya Bukhta. It was necessary to immediately mobilize and assemble about 100 men from ships and from rear,

staff and transport commands and dispatch them to protect the steep passes of Babicha, Kabardinskaya and Volchye Vorota. And the enemy was pushing through toward the coastal road leading to Tuapse and further south. In this difficult situation it was decided to order the troops of the 47th Army to consolidate their positions in the district of the cement plants on the eastern shore of Tsemesskaya Bukhta. The naval units engaged in the fighting in the city (under my command) to block the fascist troops' exit to the coastal road and thereby make it possible for the Army units to consolidate their positions.

A brigade and a regiment of marine infantry were under my command. They were supported by the shore and antiaircraft batteries as well as the ship artillery. To ensure precise and coordinated functioning of every detachment of this complicated defense mechanism, it was necessary to issue precise and exhaustive orders, instructions and commands, and to make correct decisions. It was possible to achieve this only on the basis of thorough knowledge of the situation and of our own as well as enemy forces and by maintaining uninterrupted communications.

For this reason, I set up my command post in the city center--that is, in School No 3, close to the defending units. Figuratively speaking, in this way it was easier to keep the command hand on the pulse of the battle and to do everything possible for its "revival" if it should begin to "slacken off."

Generally, in every event (I commanded a brigade of cruisers and the Azov and Danube Naval Fleets and was deputy commander of the Novorossiysk Defense Zone) I considered cooperation with the ground forces at various operational levels to be not only a matter of providing assistance to the ground forces but, first and foremost, to be a matter of solving our joint tasks by all available forces and means. The main goal was to act in coordination and jointly, to strike the enemy in the most effective way, to cause the enemy the greatest damage and deprive him of the possibility of continuing the struggle.

The correct understanding of the foundations of organization and of the goals of interaction determined not only the work of all command levels in the process of planning and organizing the overall operations and individual combat operations, but also the effectiveness of practical operations of ground and naval groups, formations and units. This will also help present-day commanders in fulfilling joint combat training tasks, organizing the training of troops and controlling the operations of their personnel.

[Question] It is known that extensive work is in progress in the fleet to generalize, propagandize and use the combat experience of past years. What are the forms of this work?

[Answer] I want to say that the combat experience accumulated by several generations of Russian and Soviet navymen represents our invaluable property. It must be preserved and multiplied. The glorious traditions born in the Great Patriotic War as well as the best of what has been created in the present-day activity of the fleet are especially dear to the present-day generation of navymen. The spreading and introduction of these traditions and achievements are promoted through political training and mass agitation,

military-historical, and cultural and enlightenment work. Patronage relations occupy a prominent place in this connection. Challenge banners, charters, badges of honor and pennants are presented annually to the best ships, detachments of marine infantry and air force units. Among those that received awards are ships named after individual persons which have been awarded the pennant of the USSR Ministry of Defense for bravery and military valor. I have already mentioned the missile cruiser Slava. The success of the crew of that ship is explained in many ways by the effective work of the commander, the deputy commander for political work and the party and Komsomol activists who skillfully use accumulated advance experience in the interest of raising combat readiness and vigilance to a higher level. They strive to ensure that every officer, warrant officer, petty officer and seaman knows well the heroic history of the Navy and of his formation and his ship, carefully preserves and accumulates combat traditions and multiplies them in the course of training and long sea voyages.

Great attention is devoted to meetings with the cruiser's veterans and direct participants in times of fiery ordeal. Veterans unfailingly participate in the ship's courage lessons, Komsomol and party meetings, discussions and topical evenings.

Military ceremonies that have become an established practice in the fleet and that are often attended by veterans of the Great Patriotic War are used as a tested form of education on the basis of combat traditions. These ceremonies include the raising of the ship's flag, the presentation of the combat banner of honor, taking the military oath, assumption of a duty position or watch duty for the first time, and meeting ships on their return from long voyages. A patriotic movement for the right to be called the successor of the best specialist of the frontline years has developed in the fleets under the slogans "Learn courage and skill from heroes of the war," "Be equal to the hero," and "We will continue and multiply the traditions of the fathers." Good news initiatives are born and established under the beneficial impact of this movement, such as the initiatives to fulfill all the tasks in long voyages only at excellent levels and to return from voyages with higher class standings, to earn only high marks in combat training launchings of missiles and torpedoes, to destroy targets on the first runs and so forth. Briefly, quite a few forms of work are used. However, form is not as important as the results of the measures taken. It is necessary to ensure that the tenets based on the many-sided experience of the frontline fighters and veterans of the fleet are used as effectively as possible in operational, tactical, combat and political training. And this work must be pursued actively not only during the periods of preparations for important events but also constantly and daily.

[Question] People say that the festive day is not as much a day of merriment as a day for summing up what has been accomplished and what has not been completed. If we approach the celebration of Navy Day using this measure, what then can be said about the tasks that have to be solved by navymen in the immediate future?

[Answer] At the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev requested that the appraisals in the summing-up of results be made

in the Leninist way and without any falsifications or hollow verbosity, that shortcomings be revealed in a principled manner and that advanced experience be gathered grain by grain. This position represents the main guideline in the activities of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists, and the entire personnel of the fleet. For, plainly speaking, in the fleet there are still shortcomings in combat and political training, in the mastering of technical equipment and weapons, in operational and tactical training, and in discipline. The most important task is to uncover these shortcomings and determine their causes and those who are patently guilty of them, to plan and consistently implement the measures designed to eliminate everything that hampers the movement forward, and to raise the level of responsibility of every individual soldier for absolute and exemplary fulfillment of his tasks and duties. And this is not only the immediate but also the follow-up task.

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CSO: 1801/305-F